The Tiga Daerah Affair:

Social Revolution or Rebellion?

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The Tiga Daerah (Three Regions) Affair, which took place in north central Java in the latter part of 1945, was one of several local[1] social upheavals which occurred in Indonesia during the months following the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945. Many of the surviving participants still refer to the turbulent events of those months as the social revolution. In the residency of Pekalongan, this revolution removed the entire bureaucratic elite of the three regencies of Brebes, Pemalang, and Tegal, the so-called Tiga Daerah.[2]

During this period, the national leadership supported, indeed encouraged, the peaceful takeover or transfer of power in all regions of Indonesia from the Japanese and Dutch-trained bureaucratic elite. But no one at the national level seems to have shared the local perception that this transfer provided an opportunity for real social and political change. Although Prime Minister Sjahrir in his pamphlet Our Struggle described the pangreh praja as nothing more than the "henchmen of the colonialists" and "an instrument fashioned by Dutch colonialism from the feudal heritage of our society",[3] his government's reformism (in replacing officials who had cooperated with the Japanese) stopped well short of supporting social revolution. Furthermore the need for change was always tempered in the minds of Sjahrir, Hatta and others in the Socialist Party cabinet by the need to attract the sympathy of the Western powers for Indonesia's struggle. They feared that the violence of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah which had shattered the old order locally could also shake the international foundations of the new Republic and the policy of diplomacy through which the leadership was trying to build an image of a stable and viable independent Indonesia.

Social revolutions in other areas of the new Republic - Aceh, Banten, and East Sumatra - generally conformed to regional (provincial) or ethnic boundaries. The Tiga Daerah, on the other hand, although fairly homogeneous, linguistically ethnically and geographically, were only a part of the residency of Pekalongan. And Pekalongan residency, though separated by a range of mountains from Banyumas in the south, nonetheless has a basic cultural homogeneity with the rest of the province of Central Java.[4]

Except for the group of Communists, whose leadership was crucial in establishing a new order during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah, local participants had no sense of carrying their revolution beyond the boundaries of the residency. On the other hand, symbolic elements in language and ritual that characterized the period in the Tiga Daerah were probably shared with other areas. Whether the local groups were Islamic, Communist, or nationalist, whether they were urban or rural, veterans of the 1920s or pemuda, a shared set of perceptions, a revolutionary consciousness, initially bound them to each other and to the wider Indonesian revolution.

Background

The socioeconomic origins of the social revolution of October-December 1945 in the Tiga Daerah go back to the intrusion of Western capitalism into the region with the introduction of the forced cultivation system in the nineteenth century. The most successful cash crop was sugar, and by the depression of the 1930s all but four of the residency's seventeen sugar mills were in the Tiga Daerah. These mills took over most of the available wet-rice land along the rich alluvial coastal plain. Thirteen of the mills closed during the depression, ending seasonal part-time employment. While twelve had reopened by 1939, wages paid to day labourers by the local mills during the 1930s (especially in Tegal) were lower than elsewhere in Java.[5]

Of crucial importance to the sugar industry was the assistance given by the local bureaucratic elite in obtaining an adequate supply of wet-rice land for the mills to plant sugar and ensuring first priority for the cane fields in the distribution of irrigation water. The mills had invested large sums in local irrigation systems to secure their water supply, but at the village level the competition between sugar and rice for water caused much social tension.[6] In order to maximize sugar content, the cane was cut as late as possible; thus when land was returned after leases had expired, it was often too late for the peasants to plant their paddy fields.

In the early years, cane-field arson was the only means of protest available to the peasantry, but by 1918 the local Sarekat Islam had begun openly to take up the peasants' cause in disputes with the mills. Unions had also begun to campaign actively for better wages and conditions for their members, the consequent unrest culminating in the railway workers' general strike of 1923.[7] By this time the PKI exercised considerable influence in this area of Java, and local branches of its People's Unions actively supported peasant opposition to burdensome taxes. Pekalongan residency became a center of radical political activity, and PKI adherents in Tegal and Pekalongan were leading proponents of a violent uprising against the Dutch in 1926. In March a premature revolt broke out in Karangcegak south of Tegal, and there were three further attempts at rebellion in August and September of that year. The Dutch were then able to trace PKI leaders in Tegal and Pekalongan and arrest virtually all of them so that the places which had pressed hardest for the rebellion were silent on November 12, 1926, the date fixed for the nationwide uprisings.[8] Most of the local nationalist leaders were either imprisoned elsewhere in Java or Madura or exiled to Boven Digul in West New Guinea.[9] During the premature

revolts in Pekalongan residency many Muslim supporters of the People's Unions were arrested along with the other rebels. Although subsequently the Dutch sugar mills tried to conciliate the local religious elite by building prayer houses in the villages around the mills, most religious leaders in the Tiga Daerah remained hostile to the colonial authority and to its Javanese representatives, the pangreh praja.

During the Japanese occupation Pekalongan residency was hard hit by wartime economic policies. The Japanese requisitioned up to half the rice crop in some areas of the Tiga Daerah to feed their Sixteenth Army, stationed in Java, as well as the Japanese civilian population and various semi-military groups and to provide rations for the corvee working on projects within and outside the residency.[10] Under the Japanese army's policy of economic self-sufficiency, regions had to feed their populations on the rice that was left over. The ban on trade between regions, together with inflation and skyrocketing black market prices, offered widespread opportunities for corruption and illegal traffic in rice. In implementing their rice-requisitioning and rationing schemes, as well as in the recruitment of corvee, the Japanese relied on the cooperation of the bureaucratic elite, who, willingly or not, became economic supervisors for the local Japanese administration. Officials at the subdistrict level, whose wives controlled the distribution of cloth, often exploited opportunities for corruption. By the end of the occupation most peasants did not have enough cerecloth (needed for wrapping the dead), but they knew that corrupt officials were hoarding precious supplies of cloth. The Japanese forced village headmen into the role of landlords, extracting rice from the peasantry to fulfill delivery quotas set at the regency level, and they also had to help their subdistricts meet their corvee

quotas. Precipitated in part by a long dry season and late arrival of the monsoon rains, famine conditions existed in the Tiga Daerah by late 1944; people were reported to be dying in the streets in rags and to be eating snails, banana roots, and forest plants.

The standard of living among Pekalongan residency's bureaucratic elite and the Japanese-created Indonesian militia, Peta, contrasted sharply with that of the rest of the population. Both groups received rations and were well paid; further, under the Japanese policy of economic self-sufficiency, Peta companies were allocated assets, including ducks, goats, fishponds, and wet-rice fields, to manage. After Peta was disbanded in August 1945, these assets were supposed to be handed over to the local republican government, but in Pemalang, the people seized them.[11]

During the last decade of their rule the Dutch had kept Islam at arm's length and harassed the nationalists. The Japanese, in contrast, made use of both religious leaders and nationalists, as well as the bureaucratic elite. Religious and nationalist leaders held key positions in such Japanese-organized bodies as Putera (Center of People's Power), the Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps), and the Pekalongan Residency Advisory Council. The pangreh praja, however, still monopolized the bureaucracy and the two lower ranks of Peta. By August 1945, the occupation had badly eroded, if not destroyed, the traditional patron-client ties between the bureaucracy and the peasantry, and the socioeconomic cleavage between the two groups had widened further. The overriding sentiment among the lower classes in 1945 was that they were being exploited by the bureaucratic elite; with that sentiment went a conviction that "they would take their revenge in the future."[12]

<u>The Course of the Tiga Daerah Affair</u>

The initial response in Pekalongan residency to the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, was elation amongst the nationalist movement and confusion in the ranks of the bureaucratic elite and the Japanese. The older radicals of the prewar nationalist movement, together with a handful of younger pemuda figures, picked up news of the Japanese surrender via various clandestine radios throughout the residency; the bureaucratic elite, however, knew nothing of the event, and their confusion was the greater because their only source of information was local Japanese officials, who refused to confirm or deny the surrender rumors.

The proclamation of independence created a dilemma for local officials over the attitude to be taken toward the Japanese civilian and military officials still in power in the residency. Some officials waited for the Japanese either to affirm or deny the declaration; others felt that the Allies would soon return to restore Dutch power. The regional head (Bupati) of Brebes recalled later in his memoirs that "Japanese officials in the regions kept completely silent" about the surrender.[13] For him, the proclamation had no meaning until the Japanese in Pekalongan residency had formally transferred power to the local Republican administration. Only then was the problem "of having to submit to two different governments" removed for the bureaucratic elite on September 27.[14] In the intervening period, the attitudes of local officials varied from unofficial acceptance of pemuda demands to fly the new Indonesian flag, through expression of private misgivings about the situation, to outright public denials that the proclamation had any validity and calls were made for caution until the Allies arrived.

The first action of local nationalist leaders was to send couriers to various contacts in Jakarta to discover what was happening

in the capital. These couriers soon returned, with messengers sent independently from Jakarta, carrying printed texts of the proclamation and revolutionary slogans, mainly in English. Reprinted and distributed locally, the slogans soon began to appear on the walls of government buildings. The first news of the proclamation for many people in the rural areas came in messages scrawled in Javanese on passing goods-train wagons.

Loosely knit groups of local revolutionaries known as struggle organizations played a crucial role in this urban-based campaign. These groups usually sprang up around an older radical of the prewar nationalist movement. The degree of formal organization and leadership style of these struggle groups varied considerably among districts, but in the first few weeks of the revolution their priorities were the same: to spread the news of the proclamation as quickly as possible, to keep the Indonesian flag flying in the face of Japanese opposition to the lowering of their own flag, and to obtain arms from the Japanese. In areas where there was no nationalist veteran of the prewar movement to lead the local revolutionary struggle, the popularly chosen Indonesian national committees (KNI) became the basis at the district or subdistrict level of local revolution.[15]

In other parts of Java, the Jakarta government appointed officials who had served as vice-residents under the Japanese as Republican residents on September 5; but no resident of Pekalongan was appointed until September 21, and then only after the Pekalongan national committee had petitioned the Secretary of State.[16] The central government's hesitation probably reflected the fact that the vice-resident, Mr. Besar, was not from either the nationalist movement or the bureaucratic elite, as other vice-residents were. In any event the delay in his appointment diminished his authority, for it was

generally believed to mean that he had doubted the proclamation or was pro-Dutch, or both.[17] Mr. Besar's position was further undermined by a breakdown in negotiations for the transfer of arms from the Japanese military police, the Kenpeitai, to local Republican forces. In Tegal, national committee leaders successfully negotiated the transfer of arms with only one casualty, but in the residency capital bloody fighting broke out on October 3 during negotiations between Resident Besar and the Kenpeitai. In the battle that ensued thirty-seven Indonesians and about seventeen Japanese were killed.[18] The Kenpeitai eventually surrendered after a three-day siege by Republican forces and the diplomacy of the resident of neighboring Banyumas, (Mr. Iskak Tjokroadisoerjo), whose arrival in Pekalongan with two Japanese advisers ended the deadlock. The remaining Japanese civilians and soldiers were subsequently evacuated south to Banyumas. On October 7, 1945, Pekalongan residency became the first region in Indonesia to become free of Japanese power.

On the following day the social revolution began in the residency, when a village headman was humiliated and removed from office in a subdistrict in southern Tegal. Within a week the revolution had swept through the rural areas of the Tiga Daerah. A district head and two subdistrict heads were killed; so too were an unknown number of village headmen, officials, and police. The revolutionary wave engulfed the regency towns of Pemalang and Tegal on October 19 and November 4, and Brebes sometime in between. In Pemalang, on the night of October 19, local revolutionaries removed the Bupati, along with the remainder of the town's bureaucratic elite, to the safety of the jail as a local crowd ransacked their houses looking for corrupt officials.[19] On November 4, a more coordinated mass demonstration in Slawi, centre of the local sugar industry twelve miles south of Tegal, began at the

headquaters of a group of radicals calling themselves AMRI (Angkatan Muda Republic Indonesia, Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia), and gathered strength as the crowd marched toward the town. According to an eyewitness:

> The group in front was wearing slings of janur kuning ¼the young yellow leaf of the coconut palm, those at the back headbands of the same, and another group was wearing it as a belt. All were chanting fiercely in Arabic la ilaha illa 'llah ("there is no god but Allah"), over and over again. Some were waving drawn swords...it was frightening...and it raised the hairs on the back of my neck, like seeing...a hungry tiger about to fall upon its victim.[20]

The "victims" included at least three officials, but, as in Pemalang, other office holders, including the mayor, took refuge in the jail on the advice of local national committee leaders. The crowd also occupied the regency office for a time, turning its contents upside down, but the Bupati himself escaped.[21] The local Republican army (TKR) battalion came under attack, defending themselves, with arms obtained earlier from the Japanese, by firing over the heads of the revolutionaries. Later, on orders from military headquarters in Yogyakarta, army units in the Tiga Daerah withdrew to Pekalongan to prevent further clashes with the people.[22]

In Brebes, where the army withdrawal was more orderly, the revolutionary violence began in the regency town itself, and was directed against the Chinese and Eurasians. Eurasians were again its victims in the vicinity of the regency's sugar mills. The three most important members of the bureaucratic elite in Brebes, the bupati, his deputy, and the Brebes district head, were all kidnapped by national committee leaders from Tegal, where they were taken and held captive for the following two months.

Thus while the bureaucratic elite were the particular targets of revolutionary violence, it was directed too against the Chinese and

Eurasians. The visible signs of Chinese wealth, their shops and rice mills, were either ransacked or taken over. Eurasians also were viewed as aliens occupying a privileged economic position, as most of them had been employed in the local sugar industry. Interned by the Japanese at the beginning of the occupation, many emerged bitter and resentful on their release in September 1945 expecting the Dutch to return to restore their prewar status. Ironically the return of the Dutch as part of the Allied (British) re-occupation of Java in late September 1945 sealed the fate of the Eurasian population in Pekalongan residency. Local rumours of Dutch terrorism against the Jakarta population fanned a fierce anti-NICA movement in the Tiga Daerah.[23] At the height of the revolutionary violence in mid-October, over 100 Eurasians, Ambonese and Menadonese were killed in Tegal and Brebes for being 'pro-NICA' or "betraying the national revolution".[24] By early November 1945, the social revolution had swept away the older order in both the urban centers - the regency towns - and the rural areas in the Tiga Daerah. While their role as representatives of Dutch and Japanese authority in Pekalongan residency had discredited the bureaucratic elite in the eyes of the people, their passive wait-and-see attitude towards the proclamation of independence further alienated them from local revolutionaries. After the early violent removal of the Japanese, the resident tried to protect the lives and property of Eurasians and officials and maintain law and order by using the army, actions which further undermined his authority. Many of the bureaucratic elite, as well as the army, took refuge in Pekalongan itself further widening the gulf between the residency capital and the Tiga Daerah. While remaining officials - some of them relatives of local TKR leaders - moved voluntarily or were taken to local jails for safety, their fate was unknown in Pekalongan. There, in the wake of news of bloody massacres of Eurasians during the anti-NICA movement, the worst was feared.

Leadership Struggles

In the subsequent weeks, throughout the Tiga Daerah, local revolutionary groups from the regency to the village level sought candidates to replace the administrators who had been removed or killed. The method of appointing new officials was as varied as the candidates chosen. In Pemalang, Soepangat, a skilled medical orderly who had been a central figure in the prewar nationalist movement, was acclaimed bupati at a mass meeting in the town square; in Tegal, after prolonged negotiation, the radical Islamic nationalist, K.H. Abu Sudja'i, whose resistance to the Dutch and Japanese was widely known, emerged as a candidate acceptable to both orthodox Muslims and Dutch-educated nationalists; in Brebes, where there was less violence during the social revolution, Kyai Syatori, a local mosque official and a vice-chairman of the Brebes Masjumi, had most support and became the new bupati.

The outcome of the struggle for political power and social ascendancy after the overthrow of the bureaucratic elite varied among regions and was different at village and subdistrict levels. The degree of violence in village-level upheavals depended on the impact of wartime depredations, the extent of corruption in the old administration, the intermediary role of the radical prewar leadership and the rivalry between the local religious establishment and semi-bandits known as lenggaong. In colonial times these local leaders had gained a livelihood from providing security to various groups within the village as well as from banditry outside it.

The most famous figure to adopt the lenggaong style in the Tiga Daerah was Kutil from Talang a subdistrict south of Tegal. A barber by trade who was regarded by many as a guru or semi-religious figure,[25] and an intermediary between the religious establishment, the lenggaong and

Dutch-educated nationalists, the main aim of Kutil and his followers during the social revolution was the re-distribution of wealth. He ransacked the houses of local Dutch and Eurasian sugar mill employees and distributed the contents, seized the local village headman's lands, distributed cloth to villages and ended up as Tegal regency police chief.[26] Indeed such was Kutil's notoriety during the social revolution that the Tiga Daerah Affair is often referred to in Indonesia as "Kutil's Movement".[27]

In nearly all villages where the headman was thrown out during the social revolution, his personal wealth was distributed, his rice divided, his property sold, and his lands and houses taken over by the new incumbent. The element of economic oppression and class conflict was more apparent in several cases where villages split, with one hamlet following the rich Muslim village priyayi, and others the lenggaong. Of 115 villages, in seven subdistricts, about 80% saw their headmen changed. Of the new headmen, whose backgrounds were remembered by informants, about one third were from groups within the village which had not previously supplied office-holders, such as lenggaong, struggle group leaders, or peasants.[28]

With no instructions coming from the residency, provincial, or central government, local revolutionaries made these changes by organizing elections to find local candidates acceptable to all groups. This task was easier at the district or subdistrict than at the village level, where economic and cultural cleavages were more evident. Elections were informal affairs but served their purpose. The following account of the procedure in a village is typical:

> There were three candidates; each candidate had his own round bamboo cylinder, with his symbol (all leaves) above it. My symbol was turi* leaves; Satum ¼who had been headman for seventeen months under the Dutch before being dismissed for corruption used janur kuning ¼young, yellow leaf of the coconut palm; and the other candidate used kluwih** leaf. People used short sticks ¼as ballot papers, which they placed in the cylinder. Everyone in the village could vote.[29]

In many districts and subdistricts, similar methods were used to choose officials as well as members of local national committees.

At the district and subdistrict levels, 97% of officials were changed, the majority of the new officials coming from previously excluded groups, namely the orthodox Islamic teachers and local nationalists, which included school teachers and KNI leaders.[30] Thus, at the subdistrict and district levels, the revolutionary struggle took on the nature of a popular movement against the pangreh praja.

At the residency and regency levels, there were three groups contending for power once the bureaucratic elite had been removed; the Communist-led popular front, the Islamic establishment and the army. These three groups had varying perceptions about the nature of the struggle they wanted to lead, reflecting their different backgrounds, compositions, and objectives.[31]

First was the group of local Communists, who on November 16 established a popular front, the so-called GBP3D (Gabungan Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah, Federation of Resistence Organizations of the Three Regions). With its headquarters in the Tegal branch of Amir Sjarifuddin's Socialist Party,[32] the popular front's main priority was

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* Turi of the Sesbania spp. is a marsh legume used for food in time of want.

** kluwih of the Artocarpus spp., a relative of the breadfruit, is used as a vegetable.

to seize political power at the residency level. Organizationally, it consisted of three separate committees under a secretariat, with each of the three regions (Tegal, Brebes, and Pemalang) having a representative on each committee. Of its ten members, six, including one Chinese, were local Communists (three members of the early PKI, two ex-Digul), while three others were members of the PNI Baru or early PNI. There were no Muslim representatives (possibly because the new bupati of Tegal and Pemalang were from the Islamic group) and no army men.[33]

K. Midjaja was the central figure in the Tiga Daerah movement, setting up both the popular front and the working committees in Tegal and Brebes.[34] A railway unionist, journalist, and pemuda leader, he had joined the Illegal PKI in 1939 and been forced to flee Solo in the face of Kenpeitai arrests in April 1942.[35] He then joined with the remnants of the Surabaya-based Illegal PKI to continue a locally based underground PKI under the leadership of Widarta, also a member of the Illegal PKI.[36] Their main aim was to continue the united front against fascism, in accordance with the line set forth by Musso in his brief visit to Surabaya in early 1936 when the Illegal PKI was established. Making Java's north coast the center of his activities, K. Midjaja began in 1943 to renew contacts with labor unionists and helped to arrange codes and cover for fugitives from Kenpeitai razzias in other parts of Java who were given sanctuary in the teak forests south of Pemalang. Being numerically small and weak Widarta's PKI group decided after the proclamation of independence that they had no choice but to continue operating underground, working with local progressive forces - the national committees and struggle organizations - against feudalism and capitalism.[37]

The objectives of the Communists are reflected in the popular front's program.[38] The local economy was to be run by cooperatives

under centralised control. The central cooperative would rent businesses and determine prices. Export of foodstuffs from the region would be strictly controlled, and the output of house gardens would be increased by encouraging planting of cash crops, such as cotton. A campaign to popularize the revolution among the people was to be run by the pemuda, and the Tiga Daerah was to have its own military units, including a two-hundred-man Executioner's Brigade. These units would receive ideological as well as military training.[39]

While the broad popular front strategy according to Widarta should be that of the national leadership, to defend the Republic against outside attack, its political demands were quite specific.[40] These were set out in a printed leaflet and a letter sent to the acting resident in early December 1945. Pekalongan residency needed "an orderly government based on socialism...sharing the same ideology". This could not be achieved while the Tiga Daerah and Pekalongan continued to be administered separately. The residency government "must be handed over to the people immediately." Those members of the bureaucratic elite in the residency capital who could not follow the revolutionary way must resign, and all those "acting like NICA or who are procolonialist shall be purged".[41]

Islam the second contender for power during the social revolution in Pekalongan residency, had two streams, the Islamic nationalists, and the modernist Muhammadiyah. The first stream who were the majority in the Tiga Daerah, saw themselves as part of the strong local anti-colonial tradition begun by the Sarekat Islam and continued by its successor the PSII, and attracted both urban and rural support, the latter from the orthodox religious teachers (ulama) including K.H. Abu Sudja'i, the future revolutionary bupati of Tegal.

At the district and subdistrict levels, 22% of the new officials appointed in the social revolution came from the Islamic nationalist group; four district and twelve subdistrict heads.[42] Two of the bupati in the Tiga Daerah were also from this group. Of the nine Muslim leaders whose biographies are known, all were popularly elected during the social revolution, and their pre-war experience and strong anti-Pangreh Praja sentiment identified them with the aspirations of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah in contrast to the Pekalongan-based Muhammadiyah.. Although all nine were born locally (unlike Communist leaders K. Midjaja and Widarta), all had spent time as pupils in Islamic schools outside Pekalongan residency during the colonial period, five of them at the well-known Tebu-ireng school at Jombang, in East Java, under the strongly nationalist and most famous traditionalist Islamic teacher in Java, K. Hasjim Asj'ari.[43] Two who had gone on the haj had stayed on in Mecca to study. Returning to their home areas when political activity in the residency was curtailed by the Dutch after 1926, all had either founded their own Muslim schools or taught in well-known local institutions. Several had become involved in prewar Muslim youth groups. During the Japanese occupation, most of the nine worked in some way with the Japanese, either in local offices of the Department of Religious Affairs, or on the Residency Advisory Council, or in leadership positions in Masjumi, Hizbullah, or the Barisan Pelopor. The Islamic nationalists dominated the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal, where seventeen out of twenty-four of its local district and subdistrict leaders were members of the orthodox religious elite.[44]

The stronghold of the second Muslim stream, the Muhammadiyah was in the batik and textile community of Pekajangan, south of the residency capital of Pekalongan.[45] Islamic nationalists such as K.H. Abu Sudja'i - himself imprisoned under both the Dutch and Japanese regimes -

considered the Muhammadiyah "very moderate and pro the colonial government", while in Pemalang town the unpopular wealthy priyayi class - mostly Muhammadiyah members - were contrasted with santri rakyat or poor santri. However in Pekajangan Muslim political sentiment reflected the socio-economic background of this self-contained trade-orientated community where a branch of the Muhammadiyah had been founded in 1922; the profits of the Pekajangan Batik Cooperative founded in 1937 went towards the establishment of a private Dutch-language primary school, run by the Muhammadiyah. This attitude towards Dutch education also reflected a difference in attitude between the two Muslim groups, for the Islamic nationalists in Tegal would not let their children 'sit at the desk of a Dutch School'.[46] Pekajangan lifestyles were also very different from the poorer Muslim communities in the Tiga Daerah. In 1953 the Muhammadiyah batik entrepreneurs, who opposed the social revolution in 1945 so vigorously, were living 'on a scale comparable to that of the upper middle class of the west; large well furnished houses, radios, a protein-rich diet, college education for their children and perhaps an automobile'.[47]

While K.H. Abu Sudja'i symbolised the Muslim-radical nationalist alliance in the Tiga Daerah, K.H. Iskandar Idris symbolised the Muslim TKR alliance in the residency capital of Pekalongan. Appointed by the Japanese to lead the Peta battalion in Pekalongan, Idris was chosen as commander of the newly formed TKR in October 1945, more out of loyalty of his former Peta subordinates than his suitability for the job. This brings us to the third groups vying for leadership, the military.

To understand the unpopularity of the Republican army in the Tiga Daerah, and why it was forced to launch a counter-revolution with Pekajangan Muslims against the popular front, it is necessary to look at the social origins of its leadership and the economic conditions of Peta members during the Japanese occupation.

All the officers of the Republican TKR regiment in Pekalongan residency were former members of the two Peta battalions established by the Japanese. It was consistent with Japanese policy that six of the eight Peta company commanders, whose backgrounds are known, should have been from bureaucratic elite families; two of the six had served as subdistrict heads before the occupation.[48] These men, together with Peta platoon commanders, made up the officer corps of the regiment's four battalions.

The immediate priority of the Pekalongan military leadership during the closing months of 1945 was to fight the British forces that had landed in Semarang on October 20. After the British landings, the army stationed several battalions (including one from Pekalongan) at Kaliwungu, to the west of Semarang, to block any British advance along the north coast. The bloody, five-day battle with the Japanese which occurred in Semarang in October, and subsequent fighting there with the British, made the defence of the Republic much more urgent than the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah.

Counter Revolution

After the clash in Pekalongan with the Kenpeitai in early October, the governor of Central Java sent Sayuti Melik, Sukarno's personal secretary at the time, to Pekalongan as his envoy. First visiting the residency capital after the removal of the Japanese, he returned in early November with the task of ratifying the choice of new revolutionary officials by local leaders. With formal authority as the governor's representative and political influence as the president's personal secretary, Sayuti Melik's opinions carried considerable weight in and outside the residency. He believed that Resident Besar's position had become untenable; for in response to the revolutionary activity against them, the resident had ordered all Eurasians to be

interned for their own protection and had attempted to see that their property was safeguarded. This had provoked further allegations that he was pro-NICA. At Sayuti Melik's request Yogya military headquarters on November 5 ordered the local TKR to arrest Besar. But the TKR, having strong ties to the bureaucratic elite, felt unable to carry out the order.[49] Besar was informed, however, and left the residency of his own accord. On November 6, R.M. Soeprapto, a high official in the governor's office in Semarang and a member of the old bureaucratic elite, arrived in Pekalongan as the new acting resident.[50] Apparently, the provincial government either saw the appointment as a temporary one or hoped that R.M. Soeprapto would be acceptable to the Tiga Daerah leaders. But he was not and they set about finding a suitable candidate to replace him.

A further incident at this time raised tensions between the popular front leaders and the contending groups in the Tiga Daerah. A regional Muhammadiyah conference was held near Tegal on November 3, and was attended by Pekalongan military commander, Iskandar Idris. While there Idris decided that he would try to meet Kutil in Talang and Sayuti Melik accompanied him. Believing the two men to be officials trying to escape, radical pemuda captured them south of Tegal and eventually took them to Slawi. Recognized by pemuda leader Soewignjo - a former friend from Boven Digul - Melik was escorted safely back to Tegal;[51] but Idris remained (willingly, according to his later account) in Slawi for the next six weeks. Neither the military in Pekalongan nor Pekajangan Muhammadiyah leaders were aware of the facts, believing Idris to be the prisoner of pemuda radicals.[52]

The capture of their Muslim commander Idris was one element in the army's strained relations with the popular front, although the fact that Idris never regained his position after his return to Pekalongan

suggests that he was a figurehead, appointed primarily because of the loyalty of his former Peta subordinates. A more important aspect of army-popular front relations was the fact that the army's warehouses containing supplies (including rice) were sealed by the popular front. Army vehicles leaving the residency capital had to obtain the permission of the popular front and Tiga Daerah pemuda guards stopped and searched them for runaway officials.

The popular front's first priority at this time was to find a suitable resident to replace acting resident Soeprapto. After considering several possible candidates, they finally approached Sardjio from Purworejo.[53] At a crucial meeting in Pemalang on December 9, they secured the agreement of the acting resident and Pekalongan revolutionary leaders to this appointment. The new resident arrived in the residency capital at noon on the following day with a sixty-strong pemuda escort company and a takeover staff. They set up their headquarters in a local hotel, from where they were to direct the revolutionary government for the next four days. After the acting resident had formally handed over to Sardjio, the new government's first act was to freeze all government department funds in order to undertake a review of residency finances. They invited the uneasy bureaucratic elite of Pekalongan to a special goodwill meeting, where it was explained that the popular front's main priority was to make local government structures more democratic. Working committees were therefore to be created at the district, subdistrict, and village levels to bring Pekalongan into line with the Tiga Daerah. In the few instances where local officials had left their posts, local working committees were to carry on the administration.

The political atmosphere underwent a dramatic change during a mass meeting held in Pekalongan on December 12 to introduce Resident

Sardjio to the people. In his speech to this meeting, popular front chairman, K. Midjaja, observed that Pekalongan Muslim pemuda were less revolutionary than those in other areas and that religion should be "put aside" in the interests of revolution. Local Islamic groups felt threatened by these remarks,[54] and it broadened the Pekajangan Muslim-TKR alliance against the Tiga Daerah to include Muslim groups from the residency capital itself. Iskandar Idris's brother, a Pekajangan Muhammadiyah teacher, asked the police in Pekalongan for permission to organize a Muslim demonstration against the popular front the following day, and he and other Pekajangan Muslims led the countermovement. On the morning of Friday, December 14, Resident Sardjio, K. Midjaja, and a small staff group were ambushed at Pekajangan while on their way to visit the southern subdistricts and Midjaja was slightly wounded.

Later that day the army arrested the resident, Sardjio, his takeover staff, and the escort company (170 people in all); three days after that, they launched a full-scale counterrevolution against the Tiga Daerah. In the military operation TKR units and Muslim groups from Pekajangan and Pekalongan swept through the Tiga Daerah, arresting about 1,600 people and releasing former members of the bureaucratic elite (including the bupati of Brebes and Pemalang) who had been living in local jails since the start of the social revolution.

Although most of the people arrested were released fairly quickly, legal and political battles over the fate of about thirty prisoners went on for more than a year. Six revolutionaries arrested in the counterrevolution were tried in Pekalongan in April 1947, the charge being "attempting to change the structure of government by force," or "inciting revolt".[55] The government's position was based on the fine distinction between righteous revolution and criminality. Up

to November 1945, popular actions against officials would be seen as pure and pardonable, but those taking place after November would be considered criminal offences. The trial was adjourned several times, until on July 21, 1947, just before the Dutch attack on the Republic, it was reported that President Sukarno had announced an amnesty for the remaining prisoners.[56]

Perceptions of Revolution in 1945

The Tiga Daerah movement was aimed at removing the bureaucratic elite which had governed on behalf of the Dutch in the decades of colonial rule and replacing it by an Indonesian authority with radically different values and attitudes. Hence the perception of revolution in this area in 1945 was cast in particular cultural terms.

During the social revolution, popular front leaders attempted to overthrow forever the dominant value system and ethos of the Javanese bureaucratic elite and to replace it with a more egalitarian, less hierarchical system. As part of the rejection of the old social hierarchy, the use of different speech levels was rejected - a radical move in the Javanese context. Thus, when Sardjio became resident he abolished aristocratic forms and titles in Pekalongan. In order that local government administration should be based on "democracy and family spirit," all communications between officials and the people were to employ the term bepak (father) as the form of address for officials, from the resident down; otherwise, bung or saudara (brother) were to be used; such feudal terms of address as paduka (your honour) and ndoro (your servant) were banned, and in order to make the Javanese system of titles more democratic all males and married and unmarried women were to be addressed in the same way.[57] In his campaign to popularize the new speech movement, K. Midjaja addressed the workers at the sugar mills:

> Beginning now, there is no longer any *Raden Mas*, *Kanjeng Gusti* or *Raden Tumenggung* ¼priyayi titles. Everyone is the same now. If you mention the president, you don't need to use Your Excellency; it is enough to say Bung Karno. Likewise, other important people should be called Bung. You should not be afraid of others; all are the same. *Kromo* ¼high Javenese is no longer necessary. You should all use just *ngoko* ¼low Javenese and Indonesian.[58]

The old language hierarchy was prized by the bureaucratic elite. It could be manipulated not only to maintain their power but also to restore order and stability in insecure situations at the village level. The bureaucratic elite saw such power in kromo that they believed that if they used it to speak to angry peasants it would defuse social unrest. Some officials believed too, that by making the peasants use kromo, they could constrain them: "in ngoko they could express demands strongly, with anger, but in kromo they could not."[59]

Inversion of the dominant elite value system occurred not only in the realm of language but also in other aspects of urban and rural life. Through ritual actions, known as *dombreng*, in the rural areas, hated corrupt or oppressive officials were exposed in symbolic public unmaskings and shamed by being paraded around.[60] In one such action occurring at the beginning of the social revolution, the headman was dressed in sacking, while his wife was made to wear a necklace of paddy symbolizing the role of the village headmen as economic supervisors for the Japanese. Both were publicly paraded to the accompaniment of the headman's own gamelan orchestra, and were further humiliated by being treated "like fowl", that is being made to drink unboiled water from a coconut shell and to eat the rice bran which is usually fed to chickens.[61] The plays presented by urban based groups, too, often portrayed the revolution as a struggle to overthrow the old master, be he bureaucratic elite or former colonial ruler.

Also in the distribution of cloth a new ideal of fairness or democracy can be seen. According to this ideal, everyone should get the same amount of cloth, regardless of need, though in one village this led to each person getting four inches. Notions of equality and fraternity expressed the values of the social revolution. Those taking part in the struggle shared an inner spirit, or being, or soul.

These cultural emphases in the perception of the revolution at local level played a part in the conflict between the Tiga Daerah and the central government. The great gulf between local realities and national priorities was felt by those on both sides of the social revolution.

At the national level, in order to present the Republic as a *fait accompli* to the Allies and the rest of the world, the first Republican cabinet's top priority was to demonstrate its authority over an orderly population. To this end, Sukarno and Hatta tried from the start to avoid having a dual - Japanese and Republican - system of administration. As Hatta put it, "orders were issued to every government official to acknowledge himself as an official of the Republic of Indonesia and be ready to accept only orders given him by superiors of Indonesian nationality".[62] At a conference of officials from throughout Java and Madura that began in Jakarta on August 30, Sukarno reassured the assembled officials that they would get "the proper place they deserved" in the new Republic. This undertaking referred to the deal worked out with the bureaucratic elite whereby they would stand behind the Republic if their positions and status were guaranteed. Only on September 25, however, were all Japanese-appointed officials formally declared civil servants of the new Republic.

The agreement between the national leaders and the bureaucratic elite had been possible only because of the position of the older

moderate nationalists who formed a majority in the first Republican cabinet. Such a deal was unthinkable, given the political realities, in the Tiga Daerah, where the older nationalists were the radicals and did not hold power. Even if the Japanese in Pekalongan had transferred power earlier and Resident Besar had been able to declare himself for the Republic on September 5 as the nationalist resident of Banyumas, to the south, had done rather than September 27, the polarization of the revolutionary movement and the bureaucratic elite could not have been prevented.

This polarization must be seen in the context of the growing isolation felt by all groups in the Tiga Daerah. Feeling abandoned in the absence of instructions from above, supercautious and bureaucratic as a result of their Dutch training, local officials waited for orders that never came.[63] The feeling of isolation from the national government was extremely frustrating for local revolutionaries as well. Following the kidnapping of the bupati of Brebes and other officials in mid-October, two local leaders decided to seek advice in Jakarta on how to stop the unrest. However officials explained to them that the problem of local unrest could only be solved by the Brebes national committee, because "the center had not had the chance to work out a solution." The home affairs ministry then sent the two revolutionaries to Semarang with a letter for the governor of Central Java. There they were told "to wait for instructions from above", which would be issued as soon as possible. After the Magelang affair had been dealt with, Brebes would get its turn.[64]

No strong regional or ethnic ties linked local with national leaders. Connections with national-government figures were personal rather than organizational. The foremost national-level figure from the Tiga Daerah in 1945 was Supeno, a prominent member of Prime Minister

Sjahrir's Socialist Party and of the fifteen-man working committee of the KNIP. Later the chairman of both these bodies, he was the key defence lawyer in the trial of the Tiga Daerah leaders in early 1947. Minister of defence in Amir Sjarifuddin's first cabinet, he was shot by the Dutch during the second police action. Supeno, who was born in Tegal, had kept in contact with several local national committee leaders with whom he had been at school in the early 1930s. The same local group of Sjahrir-type Marxists had links with another prominent nationalist from Tegal, Soebagio Mangunrahardjo, the last PNI Baru chairman and also a close friend of Sjahrir. Local Communists had links with Amir Sjarifuddin through underground work during the occupation.

The political isolation of the Tiga Daerah was reflected in, indeed may have been a result of, a great sense of physical isolation, which members of the revolutionary movement recall today as a central feature of this period. Although there was contact with Jakarta, via couriers, for a time following the proclamation, after mid-October when the social revolution had swept away the old order in Pemalang, communications were cut between the Tiga Daerah and the residency capital. Although post offices remained open, there was apparently no mail from outside the Tiga Daerah, and few people dared travel the roads because of the rural unrest. The residency's two local newspapers, Pelita Rakjat in Tegal and Pantjaran Nasional in Pekalongan, must have been the only source of outside news for those without radios.

One response by Jakarta to the social revolutions occurring in various regions was a political announcement signed by Sukarno and Hatta on October 27. Warning people that acting by themselves would only result in anarchy, it specified that demands for the replacement of local officials should be "made via the government or with the mediation

of the national committees as the temporary representatives of the people."[65] By this time, however, the entire government apparatus at the district and subdistrict levels in the Tiga Daerah was in disarray and, as we have seen, the local national committees, as well as the police, had ceased to function. All the Tegal KNI could do for officials, who early in November felt their lives to be threatened, was to suggest that they move to the only safe place remaining, the local jail.

The implications of Prime Minister Sjahrir's attitude discussed above became clear when he came to Pekalongan at the end of a presidential whistle-stop tour of Java in late December 1945. Earlier the government had sent a delegation of four Socialist Party leaders, including two ministers, to Pekalongan to try and mediate between the Tiga Daerah and the residency capital, instructing them to explain to the bureaucratic elite that as a people's movement, the Tiga Daerah had the central government's support and to Tiga Daerah leaders in Pemalang "that Sjahrir wasn't supporting feudalism but could not tolerate the lawlessness of the social revolution."[66] When Sjahrir, Sukarno, Hatta, and their entourage arrived in Pekalongan on December 22, they found the communist resident, his staff, and the entire leadership of both the popular front and the revolutionary movements throughout the Tiga Daerah in jail in Pekalongan. But they largely ignored the army's counter revolution, saying little about the situation in public and calling only privately on the TKR commander for an explanation of the army's action. Sjahrir complained in a speech that he had more difficulty in dealing with Pekalongan than with the outside world and went on to express his disapproval of the local struggle, using an analogy with building materials. There were two kinds, said Sjahrir, those that passed the quality test and those that did not. "It was as if

Pekalongan had not passed the test," recalls an official who was present.[67] In Sjahrir's view, the type of transfer of power that passed the quality test was one that was peaceful and orderly. Peacefully replacing a Japanese-appointed official was one thing, violent social upheaval quite another. Sukarno's only reference to the situation appears to have been during a brief stopover in Tegal, when he mentioned the "Talang State," suggesting that the social revolution was a separatist movement.[68] Hatta reportedly complained in December 1945 that there was "too much popular sovereignty" in Pekalongan residency. The people could not get rid of the pangreh praja just like that, said Hatta; only the government had that right.

Aftermath

The social revolution of October-December 1945 saw the complete overthrow of the bureaucratic elite, the ruling class in the Tiga Daerah. The old order had gone for good. The TKR counterrevolution in mid-December did not reestablish the bureaucratic elite in their former position; it merely removed certain radicals - but not the Muslim bupati of Tegal and Brebes - from the local administration and disbanded the regency working committees in Tegal and Brebes. The impossibility of re-establishing the old order was clear when the next resident, Soemitro Kolpaking, a former bupati from an old Banyumas bureaucratic elite family, tried to replace Muslims chosen during the social revolution with former officials.[69] Local opposition to such a return to the status quo ante forced the center to find a fourth resident in as many months. This time, Wali al-Fatah, a radical Muslim leader prominent in the national left wing coalition, Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union) and a Masjumi vice-chairman, was chosen.[70] With the replacement of Soepangat (arrested by the army) as bupati of Pemalang by a local religious teacher, the ascendancy of Islam

in Pekalongan residency continued until, in late 1948, two of the santri bupatis (of Brebes and Pemalang) died as heroes at the hands of the Dutch during the guerrilla war.

The bureaucratic elite thrown out during the social revolution were in most cases reappointed to jobs either in the civilian police or in autonomous towns elsewhere in Central Java. When the Dutch occupied areas of the north coast after the first clash, some officials worked, willingly or otherwise, for their former Dutch superiors. Others (such as the Bupati of Brebes) whose experiences during the social revolution had made them staunch Republicans refused and set up local Republican governments-in-exile in the mountains near Wonosobo to the south.

At the district and subdistrict levels, the orthodox Muslim teachers chosen during the social revolution stayed in office until after the transfer of sovereignty, when many moved to local departments of religious affairs in the regency towns. Most local non-religious nationalists chosen by the people in 1945 also made careers in the civil service after 1950, as did some struggle movement leaders. One important result of the social revolution was thus an opening-up of the civil service at the local level. Nearly all the new village headmen stayed in office until well after the transfer of sovereignty in 1950, some until after the upheaval of 1965, when nearly all remaining since the Tiga Daerah Affair were removed.

The power struggle between the revolutionaries and the bureaucratic elite in the Tiga Daerah was more than just a struggle for administrative positions. It was not just a case of new wine in old wineskins, or old structures manned by new people - although in the colonial context of monopolization of these jobs by the bureaucratic elite, this change in itself would have been no small achievement. Local revolutionaries clearly saw that the structures themselves had to

change. To make the administrative structure of local government more democratic, it was necessary to increase the people's participation through the creation of representative councils at all levels. Many local leaders saw first the local national committees then the working committees and finally the popular front that replaced them in the Tiga Daerah as sharing for the first time the bureaucratic power previously monopolized by the Dutch-trained elite. The change was not something they would give up lightly.

1. That is, at the residency level or below (regency, district, subdistrict, and village).

2. The Pekalongan residency in 1945 consisted of four regencies: the Tiga Daerah and the huge Pekalongan regency, which made up almost a third of the residency. The local Javanese bureaucratic elite consisted of the Dutch-trained pangreh praja (lit. 'rulers of the realm'), a salaried class of officials, and below them the village headmen. For the formation of the elite as a class in Java see Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi, ASAA Southeast Asia Publication Series No. 2 (Singapore, Heinemann, 1979).

3. Soetan Sjahrir, Our Struggle, trans. by Benedict Anderson. (Ithaca: Cornell, Modern Indonesia Project, 1968), p. 26.

4. This is not to say, of course, that Tegal and Pekalongan do not have their own linguistic and cultural peculiarities; low Javanese, for example, is pronounced in a distinct way in the Tegal region, which also has its individual music and wayang tradition.

5. Indisch Verslag, s'-Gravenhage/Batavia, 1931, 1935, 1938.

6. Sugar needs almost three times as much water as wet rice.

7. For a discussion of this strike, see John Ingleson, "'Bound Hand and Foot': Railway Workers and the 1923 Strike in Java", Indonesia, no. 31 (April 1981), pp. 53-87. Unions representing pawnshop employees, dockworkers, and sugar-mill workers also organized strikes in Pekalongan residency during this period.

8. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 331-333, 340.

9. At least one religious leader was among those exiled to Boven Digul, and later to Australia. This was Haji Moeklas, the father of M.H. Lukman, the PKI politbureau leader in the post-1951 Aidit PKI. While still overseas in 1945, other veterans of this early period who had returned to the region by the Japanese occupation played key leadership roles in the Tiga Daerah Affair.

10. Rice was also requisitioned for stockpiles needed lest there be an attack on Java from the south and, in the last year of the war, for the Seventh Division headquarters in Singapore. For details on the amount of rice requisitioned in various parts of the Tiga Daerah see Anton Lucas, "The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1980), p. 52, table 2.

11. Transcript of taped interview with Djuweni Wimbohandoko, Tegal Peta battalion commander, Yogyakarta, April 17, 1975.

12. This phrase comes from a conversation between Dr. Moerjawan Pemalang regency's medical officer and a patient, the driver of a horse-cart, late in the Japanese occupation, recorded in Moerjawan, "Ichtisar" ¼a resume (typescript, ¼1946), inventory 201 "Omwentelingzaak te Pekalongan". This is a collection of Republican documents relating to the Tiga Daerah Affair seized by the Dutch from Yogyakarta in 1949, now part of the Archive of the Procurator General, Dutch Public Archives ¼hereafter Proc. Gen..

13. Sarimin Reksodihardjo (Bupati of Brebes), "Kenang Kenangan dari Masa yang Silam" ¼Memories from the Past (typescript, 1965).

14. Sarimin Reksodihardjo, Question 15, "Keterangan" ¼An Explanation, Jan. 31, 1946, Proc. Gen.

15. Not all these national committees were chosen by local revolutionary groups, some were appointed by local officials. The former were more effective, usually taking the initiative in relieving economic distress by distributing surplus cloth and rice.

16. The petition, "Moesi Komite Nasional Daerah Pekalongan", ¼Motion of the Pekalongan Region National Committee Sept. 12, 1945, was replied to by a letter from Secretary of State A.G. Pringgodigdo to Dr. Soembadji, Pekalongan KNI chairman, Sept. 21, 1945. I am grateful to the late Besar Martokoesoemo S.H. for allowing me to use these documents from his personal collection.

17. For an appreciation of Besar's contribution to the legal profession in Indonesia, see Daniel S. Lev, "In Memoriam: Besar Martokoesoemo S.H. (1894-1980)", *Indonesia*, no. 30 (Oct. 1980), pp. 121-23.

18. *Warta Berita*, Oct. 8, 1945; *Buku Kenangan Pembangunan Monumen Pahlawan Pekalongan* ¼Pekalongan Heroes' Memorial Commemorative Book ¼Pekalongan: n.p., 1964).

19. For a more detailed account of these events, see Anton Lucas, "Social Revolution in Pemalang, Central Java, 1945", *Indonesia*, no. 24 (Oct. 1977), pp. 108-20.

20. Marsum Hardjoprajitno "Ceritaku: Percikan Peristiwa Bersejarah Hari Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Daerah Tegal dan Sekitarnya" ¼My Story: a history of the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence in the Tegal region (typescript, 1974).

21. He was later able to leave Tegal in the cabin of a locomotive, dressed as a driver.

22. Several people were wounded in the clashes with the TKR. Transcript of taped interview with Djuweni Wimbohandoko, Yogyakarta, April 17, 1975.

23. NICA was the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, which had arrived in Jakarta with a company of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (the KNIL) under the leadership of van Mook, together with the British forces, on September 29, 1945.

24. Interviews in Tegal in Feb. and April, 1973, and in Brebes and Tegal, Balapulang and Jatibarang in November 1975; Soesmono (Tegal kabupaten KNI vice-chairman), typescript, 1972; Kartohargo (Brebes KNI chairman), proces-verbaal, Pekalongan, Oct. 23, 1946, Proc. Gen.

25. Sartono Kartodirdjo describes a guru as among those charismatic powerful natural leaders in the village forming an unofficial religious elite with contacts and authority over a wide area. See his "Agrarian Radicalism in Java", in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 78.

26. From interviews with Tauchid (village headman of Kajen village), Kajen, Feb. 9, 1973 and Nov. 29, 1975; Kutil's son in Pemalang, Nov. 1974; Abdul Latip (Talang KNI chairman), Tegal, Feb. 6, 1973; Kho I Sin (Kutil's Chinese chauffeur), Tegal, Feb. 21, 1973.

27. Kutil, held responsible for the murder of a number of officials, was sentenced to death by a Pekalongan court on Oct. 21 1946, according to a Pekalongan Court Declaration, no. 1, 1950 (Diponegoro Division (Kodam VII), military history section, Semarang). Because Kutil escaped in July 1947 as the Dutch were occupying Pekalongan, the sentence was not carried out until May 5, 1951 when Kutil was executed by firing squad after President Sukarno had rejected an appeal for clemency. "Keputusan President Republic Indonesia ¼Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree no. 336/G, 21 April 1951" (Diponegoro Division military history section); Maj. Gen. Soedharmo, (Pekalongan TKR leader), Interview, Jakarta, Oct. 23, 1971).

28. Interviews in Brebes and Bumiayu subdistricts of Brebes, Watureja and Balapulang in Tegal, and Ulujami, Comal and Moga in Pemalang, February and November 1975.

29. Interview with village KNI chairman, Krasak village, Dec. 5, 1975.

30. Sixty-one out of sixty-three subdistrict and district heads were replaced. Among the new officials were seventeen members of the former elite, fourteen Muslim leaders and fourteen school teachers. For further details, see Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", Appendix E, pp. 421-24.

31. While in the following discussion Muslims and communists are treated separately, in the Tiga Daerah Affair (as in the 1926 attempted rebellion) a clear line cannot always be drawn between them. In the regency town of Pemalang and the district/subdistrict level in the radical centres of Ketanggungan West, Slawi, Adiwerna, Jatinegara (the home of H. Moeklas - see footnote 9) and Randudongkal, Muslim teachers and non-religious radicals worked actively together in local revolutionary movements.

32. The Barisan Pelopor, the town's largest revolutionary group, run by veterans of the pre-war nationalist movement, was replaced by Parsi (Partai Sosialis). Soon after its establishment in Yogya on November 1, however, Parsi became part of the Indonesian Socialist Party in December 1945.

33. For the composition of the GBP3D, see Lucas, "Bamboo Spears", Appendix G, p. 428.

34. The nine-member working committees (Badan Pekerja) set up by K. Midjaja in Tegal and Brebes to replace the non-functioning national committees during the social revolution in early November, were also dominated by radicals (in Tegal mostly communists). Although in theory advising the Muslim bupati, these regency-level working committees (whose membership in both cases overlapped with the GBP3D), in practice took over most of the functions of local government in Brebes and Tegal from early November until December 14.

35. Kamidjaja or K. Midjaja (as he wrote his pseudonym), the son of a small peasant farmer, was born on August 7, 1909, near Kartasura, in Central Java. After village primary school he worked on the railways (except for two years in prison after the attempted Communist rebellion of 1926) until 1933, when he was dismissed for passive resistance against the railway company's order banning employees from joining the Railway Workers' Union. From 1935 to 1941 he was an editor of Mimbar Boeroeh in Solo and a leader of the prewar labor movement. From April 1942 until 1945 he coordinated underground PKI work on Java's north coast. He was one of the six Tiga Daerah leaders eventually brought to trial in Pekalongan; upon his release, in July 1947, he returned to union activities. Before 1965, he was for a number of years a secretary of the PKI's powerful Verification Committee (the party's watchdog responsible to congresses for its financial affairs). He died on March 6, 1966.

36. Subandi Widarta, born about 1913 in Kediri was educated at a Dutch-language primary school in Surabaya, but dropped out of Intermediate School (MULO). Active in various youth groups, after joining the Illegal PKI in 1936, he went to south Sumatra to gain experience working in the labour movement in oil refineries in Palembang and Sambu Island. Forced to leave by the Dutch after strikes had occurred he returned to Java, joined Gerindo, and worked as a journalist for Pesat in Semarang. Active in Jakarta at the time of the Proclamation in planning ways to seize power from the

Japanese and spreading news of independence to the regions, he came to Pekalongan as a top Pesindo leader and as representative of the Minister of Information Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin. While attending popular front meetings in the Tiga Daerah he was not actually a member of the GBP3D. Arrested by the army in Pekalongan on Dec. 23, 1945, he was executed in the year following his release from prison in mid-1947 because of an internal PKI dispute. After the PKI's tertiary institution the Ali Archam Academy was opened to the public in the early sixties, the central party school for training cadres remaining within the academy was secretly named the Widarta Institute. For the activities of Widarta's underground PKI see Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", pp. 92-105, and Anton Lucas, "Reminiscences of Underground Work in Java during the Japanese Occupation" (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming).

37. Interview with a former underground member, Jakarta, July 5, 1978.

38. This program is clearly spelled out in the minutes of the GBP3D's second meeting on 25 November 1945, Proc. Gen. For a translation see Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", p. 429.

39. Negotiations were underway with military headquarters in Yogya to reestablish a TKR presence in Tegal, but members of the popular front disagreed about whether to invite the TKR back or establish their own militia. Eventually the latter alternative was chosen.

40. Minutes of popular front meeting, Tegal, 25 November 1945, Proc. Gen., trans. in Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", p. 434.

41. The leaflet "Toentoetan Rakjat 3 Daerah Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang Terhadap Pemberesan Daerah Pekalongan "¼The Demand of the People of the Three Regions of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang for the Settlement of the Conflict in Pekalongan Region, and letter (Proc. Gen.) are translated in Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", pp. 439-40.

42. If those santri who were also KNI leaders or teachers were counted as part of the Muslim group, the total would be 28%. Two of the four wedana both served as wedana of Slawi each for only a matter of days. The first, a Muhammadiyah teacher (the only modernist Islamic representative to obtain bureaucratic power in the Tiga Daerah) was removed after four days in office; his successor, a former vice-consul in Jeddah, was killed.

43. During the Japanese occupation K. Hashim Asj'ari held two important posts as chairman of Masyumi and (from mid 1944) head of the Office of Religious Affairs. After its reorganisation as a political party, in November 1945, Asj'ari was elected chairman of Masyumi's first party council. K.H. Fachruri, when interviewed in Slawi on December 15, 1972, could still recite in Arabic an Indonesian song learnt from K. Asj'ari while studying in Tebu-ireng, a free English rendition of which would go:

We the people of Indonesia,
Let us unite in our own groups,
We shall organize for our faith.
We must be true!
We must hold fast to our weapons.
To strengthen the ranks of Islam,
For the glory of Islam.
To educate our youth for the struggle.

44. Interview with K.H. Fachruri, Slawi, 5 Dec. 1972. The Tegal regency-level leader of the Barisan Pelopor, K.H. Fachruri later became wedana of Adiwerna during the social revolution.

45. For an account of the Pekajangan community, see Suzannah Price, "Religion, Social Organisation, and Textile Production in a Javanese Village", (M.A. thesis, Australian National University, 1978).

46. Abu Sudja'i, Interview in Tegal on Nov. 20, 1975.

47. This American observer noted that the houses of the batik entrepreneurs 'would cost around US$25,000 to build in a Long Island residential district ¼and. would not look at all out of place if transferred there'. Boyd Compton, Letter to the Institute of Current World Affairs in New York, Jakarta, Jan. 11, 1953.

48. Of the two Peta battalions stationed in the residency of Pekalongan, one was in Tegal and the other in Pekalongan itself. The two company commanders not from pangreh praja families were prominent religious teachers. For Peta/TKR social backgrounds, see Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", pp. 350-52 and 442-48.

49. Maj. Gen. Soedharmo (Pekalongan TKR leader) Interview, Jakarta, March 26, 1973.

50. Sayuti Melik appears to have played no part in Soeprapto's appointment, at least according to his account in an interview, "Later Belakang 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah' berbeda dengan latar belakang 'Peristiwa Madiun'", *Berita Buana*, Jan. 13, 1977. In an interview in Jakarta on Oct. 30, 1971, Sayuti Melik recalled canvassing, during his first visit to Pekalongan, the possibility of himself becoming resident to replace the beleagued Besar, but this was greeted without enthusiasm in Pekalongan "Because I was not a member of the *Pangreh Praja*". Ideological differences with communist popular front leaders Widarta and K. Midjaja also made him unacceptable in the Tiga Daerah. Soesmono (Tegal KNI vice-chairman), typescript, 1972.

51. For two accounts of this incident see the interview with Sayuti Melik in *Berita Buana*, Jan. 13 1977, and Soewignjo's version in "Sebuah renungan kecil: penyelamat jiwa Sayuti Melik", *Berita Buana* ¼a short account of Sayuti Melik's rescue., April 28, 1977.

52. According to an account written later by Idris, he lived in a house outside the Slawi pemuda headquarters with some of his family. Iskandar Idris, "Sedikit Catatan Sekedar yang Saya Alami dan Ketahui" ¼Some notes on what I know and experienced (typed notes of Armed Forces Museum interview team, July 26, 1972). Soewignjo claimed that, although he was not a prisoner, Idris had been told his safety could not be guaranteed if he returned to Pekalongan. Interview, Jakarta, Dec. 12, 1971.

53. Sardjio was a former member of the PNI Baru; during the Japanese occupation he was elected a member of the Kedu residency advisory council and later appointed to the All-Java Advisory Council. Arrested by the Japanese in 1944 on suspicion of being a member of the underground PKI, he was serving a thirteen-year jail sentence when released in late September 1945.

54. "The Crisis in the Region of Pekalongan Residency", unsigned letter from the Tegal branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, Dec. 20, 1945, Proc.Gen.

55. They were charged under section 107 of the criminal code, for which the maximum penalty was 15 years jail. See Yap Sin Fong, Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana Indonesia ¼The Indonesian Criminal Law Code Jakarta, Saksama, 1954, p. 50.

56. Iwa Kusumasumantri, Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia ¼A History of the Indonesian Revolution, Jakarta, Grafica n.d. ¼1965 vol. II, p. 68; "Daftar Nama-Nama Perintis Kemerdekaan dalam Periode 1908-1945 dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Singkatnya" ¼A List of Pioneers of Independence from 1908-1945 with brief biographical notes (membership book kept by the Tegal branch of Pioneers of Independence). Sukarno's amnesty is recorded under the entry for Amir, the communist popular front leader from Pemalang.

57. "Announcement of the Republican Government of Pekalongan Residency, no. 1/B, 11 December 1945", Proc.Gen., translated in Lucas, "Bamboo Spear", p. 441. See also Bennedict Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah: The Politics of Language and Javanese Culture" (paper delivered at the Conference on Multilingualism in Modern Indonesia, Puncak, Aug. 1981).

58. This example of a speech by K. Midjaja was provided by a Brebes sugar mill employee in an interview in Tegal on Nov. 19, 1975.

59. Wadyono (Pekalongan TKR commander), Interview, Semarang, Aug. 27, 1971.

60. The word dombreng comes from tong and breng, two onomatopaeic Javanese words for the sounds of banging on wood or metal. To be "dombreng-ed" during the social revolution meant to be paraded around to the accompaniment of clanging tin pots and wooden clappers.

61. Interview with a son of the former village headman, Jatinegara, Feb. 13, 1975.

62. B.R. O'G. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics, 1945-1946" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1966), p. 116.

63. Not one of my pangreh praja informants remembered the national conference of their spokesmen and the national leaders or recalled anyone attending from Pekalongan residency.

64. Kartohargo (Brebes national committee chairman), Question 5, Proces-verbaal, Jan. 15, 1947, Proc.Gen. The Magelang affair mentioned here refers to the fighting between British and Republican forces in that Central Java town on Nov. 1, 1945.

65. Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan undang undang, peraturan peraturan penetapan penetapan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 1945 ¼A Collection of Laws, Regulations and Decrees of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, rev. ed. (Jakarta, Seno, 1951), p. 68.

66. Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Jakarta, Aug. 7, 1972.

67. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono (Pekalongan assistant-resident) Puncak, July 30, 1973.

68. Talang, a subdistrict south of Tegal, was renowned because of Kutil as we have seen.

69. Soemitro Kolopaking who arrived in Pekalongan 23 Jan. 1946 to replace acting resident Suprapto (who had been called back by Pekalongan's Pesindo on Dec. 17 after the arrest of Sardjio by the army), was himself replaced by Wali al-Fatah on April 16, 1946, Antara Jan. 25 and April 18, 1946.

70. For a biographical note on Wali al-Fatah, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 455.

Not to be quoted

THE 'TIGA DAERAH' AFFAIR OF 1945:

SOCIAL REVOLUTION OR 'REBELLION'?

by

Anton Lucas

Paper for the panel on 'The Regional Dimension of the Indonesian National Revolution', AAS meetings, Toronto, 13-15 March, 1981.

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THE 'TIGA DAERAH' AFFAIR OF 1945: SOCIAL REVOLUTION OR 'REBELLION'?

'Together we will build an orderly government based on socialism'

The Demand of the Tiga Daerah, 5 December 1945[1]

Do the perceptions of local participants in any revolution really matter to the historian? John Smail's pioneering study of Bandung in the early revolution over fifteen years ago was the first attempt to show that, in writing a local history of the Indonesian revolution, oral sources, including recollections of kampung people who had experienced events first hand are invaluable.

While the Indonesian revolution is one of the most studied of Southeast Asian revolutions, it is the national, not the local level that had been the focus of most studies until recently. The complexities of the revolution and its internal dynamics at the local (that is the Residency level and below[2]) have tended to be glossed over and the views of the rank and file revolutionaries have gone unnoticed. Unless we continue to try to get at what local participants really felt they were doing and hoping for, it will never be possible to get a complete picture of the

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[1]"The Demand of the People of the Three Regions of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Region of Pekalongan" signed by the Federation of Struggle Organisations of the Three Regions 5 December 1945. A translation of this demand is to be found in Anton Lucas, 'The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: the Revolution against the Bureaucratic Elite in north central Java in 1945' (Australian National University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1980), Appendix I, 439 (subsequently cited as Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear').

[2]That is kabupaten (or regency), district (kewedanan), subdistrict (kecamatan) and village levels. The officials in charge of these areas were the bupati, wedana, camat and lurah respectively.

Indonesian revolution while it is still within living memory, 'from the bottom up', and the regional dimension will always remain obscure.[3]

The 'Tiga Daerah' (Three Regions) Affair or "social revolution" occurred in the kabupaten (regencies) of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang in Pekalongan residency in north central Java in 1945. Its origins, the nature of its leadership, and why it ended the way it did have been and are still much debated in Indonesia today. In particular the actual nature of the social revolution has remained obscure, as well as how it "fitted in" to the wider dimension of the revolution in Indonesia as a whole. Perhaps the debates could have been resolved sooner but for the limitations of certain kinds of sources for local history during the Indonesian revolution.

As the social revolutions in various parts of Indonesia are one of the factors distinguishing the regional dimension of the Indonesian revolution I have taken this as the theme of this paper. The attitude of the national-level leadership to the Tiga Daerah Affair also highlights the great gulf between local perceptions and national priorities during this early period of the revolution.

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[3]For various reasons national archives and newspapers are virtually silent on local events, while local archives and newspapers have usually not survived. This leaves the participants themselves, as the main source for in-depth local-level studies. However local participants are often inaccessible, having frequently moved away from areas where they played important roles during the revolution. Some are unwilling at first to talk about past events for reasons relating to the current political climate and the course of Indonesian history since the revolution. Also local participants are often not used to being interviewed like national-level leaders.

The Social Revolution

> 'Social revolutions are present when one social stratum, cooperating on a solidarity basis . . . attempts to wrest political power and social ascendancy from the ruling stratum'
>
> W. F. Wertheim[4]

> 'The People acted violently, they thought the Pangreh Praja were corrupt'
>
> Pak Doellah, a subdistrict head in south Tegal[5]

The first signs of open conflict between the Dutch trained bureaucratic elite, the Pangreh Praja and the perjuangan (revolutionary movement) in Pekalongan residency began in late August over the raising of the Indonesian flag. Initial attempts by revolutionary groups to persuade officials in the kabupaten towns and the Residency capital itself, to fly the Indonesian flag, without the Japanese flag alongside failed. While most officials stayed silent, Sarimin the young and able Bupati of Brebes was quite outspoken in his views about the Proclamation. According to a leading Brebes revolutionary, the Bupati '. . . did not wish to confirm the Proclamation and as regional head did not want to announce it. This was clear from his question "what is the meaning of a proclamation that has only been signed by two people?"'[6] As region head, Sarimin also toured the kabupaten, making his views known. A local santri leader recalls part of another speech at a district meeting:

> Independence depends on the attitude of the Allies; we didn't win the war, the Allies did. You must just wait and see what their

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[4]W. F. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation (Penguin, 1974), 152.

[5]Interview on 15 September 1971.

[6]Kartohargo, Question 14, Proces-verbaal, 23 October 1946 to be found in Inventory 201, 'Omwentelingzaak te Pekalongan', in the Procurator-General collection in the Dutch Public Archives (subsequently cited as Proc. Gen.).

attitude is when they land. If they wish us to be independent so we will be. Independence or no independence, what is necessary now is security and order (aman dan tenteram).[7]

While the new government in Jakarta quickly appointed the Japanese vice-residents (Fuku shuchokan) as Republican residents in other part of Java on 5 September, no one was appointed as Resident of Pekalongan until several weeks later, after the Pekalongan KNI (Indonesian National Committee) had petitioned the Secretary of State, A. G. Pringgodigdo. By the time the vice-resident Mr Besar, a local Tegal lawyer, had been appointed on 21 September, there were suspicions among the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries that the reason for the delay was his supposed pro-Dutch sympathies. While the central government had more likely hesitated because he was neither from the pergerakan (prewar nationalist movement) or the Pangreh Praja as the other vice-residents were, from then on the Pekalongan region KNI was suspect in the eyes of radical Tiga Daerah leaders for backing as Resident someone who 'doubted' the Proclamation, or was 'pro-Dutch', or both.

While the fact that everyone was expecting the Allies to return at any moment after 17 August helps to explain a lot of Pangreh Praja caution, the lack of a strong openly pro-Republican leadership at the top of the Residency bureaucracy did nothing to convince other officials who were sitting on the fence, to take a firm stand on the side of the Republic. They refused to distribute the surplus rice lying unused from the last harvest in stockpiles all over the Tiga Daerah--part of the forced deliveries from the peasants under the Japanese program of economic self-sufficiency for all occupied regions. While the Pangreh Praja's role as agents for the Japanese in implementing and policing these forced deliveries was the main reason for their unpopularity, accusations of corruption by officials and their

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[7]Interview, 6 December 1975.

wives who implemented the rationing of basic commodities, in particular cloth, throughout the Occupation were widespread. Certain officials were also notorious as romusha raisers.[8] Thus the fact that many of the more progressive officials had changed their views about the validity of the Proclamation by the end of September, when the difficulties of having to 'serve two master'--the Japanese and Republicans (about which more will be said later) was removed, did not save them all from the same fate.

Republican Resident Besar's authority in the Tiga Daerah was further undermined by what leaders there saw as his failure to negotiate the transfer of arms from the kenpeitai (Japanese military police) to local Pekalongan military (BKR) units. While in Tegal the local KNI had negotiated this transfer with only one casualty, in the residency capital of Pekalongan bloody fighting broke out on 3 October during the Resident's negotiations for the arms transfer, and ended with 37 Indonesians and as many as 17 Japanese killed.[9] The kenpeitai eventually surrendered after the arrival of the Resident of neighbouring Banyumas (Mr Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo) with several Japanese aides. The subsequent transport of the remaining Japanese civilians and soldiers south to Banyumas, removed the last support still holding the crumbling edifice of Pangreh Praja authority in Pekalongan residency, the first region in all Indonesia to be free of the Japanese on 7 October 1945.

On the same night the first of hundreds of village headmen were thrown out of office, in a village in the south of Tegal kabupaten in a ritual known locally as dombreng, being publicly and ritually unmasked and paraded around to the

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[8]The romusha were forced labour sent to work on projects within as well as outside the Residency.

[9]Buku Kenangan Pembangunan Monumen Pahlawan Pekalongan (Pekalongan, 1964), Warta Berita, 8 October 1945.

banging of empty cans and sticks. The headman's house was surrounded by an angry crowd calling for him to come out. At first he refused, but early the following morning dressed in his full headman's uniform the lurah emerged and asked the crowd who were threatening to kill him what he had done wrong. He was disarmed and dressed in sacking, while his wife was made to wear a necklace of paddy (symbolising the role of the village headmen as economic supervisors for the Japanese). Then both were dombreng-ed for all to see to the accompaniment of the headmen's own gamelan orchestra, the whole five kilometers to the subdistrict town of Jatinegara. There the official and his family were further humiliated, being treated 'like fowls', by being made to drink unboiled water from half a coconut shell and to eat rice bran, usually only fed to chickens. The lurah and his family were then imprisoned in the kecamatan office so local revolutionary leaders including the new subdistrict head--the old Japanese-appointed official had fled--could keep an eye on them.[10]

Scenarios such as we have just described continued over the following weeks, the revolutionary wave rising towards the coast, and breaking over the kabupaten capitals of Pemalang on 19 October and Tegal on 4 November. Any official who had indulged in a 'show of luxury' (kelihatan mewah) during the Occupation had his house ransacked, and the contents taken out and burnt. Village lands used by officials in lieu of salary (bengkok), the most visible sign of the headman's wealth and the most easily 'accessible' land available within the village, were confiscated, and the product from the land was distributed. What happened in a village south of Pemalang was typical:

> The bengkok was controlled by the people, who wanted to take it over for themselves. . . . The paddy was collected in the village rice barn, then the people were asked to have a meeting about how to divide it. It was decided that those ten years and over would get the same as

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[10]Interview with elder son of former lurah on 13 February 1975.

> adults (25 kilograms per person), those under ten would get half. There was no difference between rich and poor, in principle everyone got a quota. However, the rich were asked to hand over their quotas to add to those of the poor. In general the rich did not dispute this . . . they were afraid that their sawah would be taken over by the people.[11]

By the end of October out of 63 district and subdistrict heads throughout the Tiga Daerah, only one or possibly two Japanese-appointed officials remained.

The Eurasians or 'Indos' as they were called were also seen in the Tiga Daerah as aliens occupying a privileged economic position. A majority were employed as plantation supervisors, labour foremen and contractors, chemical analysts and machinists in the 17 sugar mills which operated in Pekalongan residency until the depression. The internment of those of 'more than fifty per cent European blood'[12] at the beginning of the Occupation left many bitter and resentful after being released during September 1945. Most were at least dubious about the Republic, and expected the Dutch would return to restore their former status. Soon after NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) Representatives had landed in Jakarta with the British on 29 September, rumors of NICA atrocities began reaching the Tiga Daerah via railway, telegraph and telephone. By early October an anti-NICA movement had gained momentum in the region, and on 11 October violence broke out as the people rounded up Eurasians near the local sugar mills, and accused them of 'betraying the national revolution'. Many were summarily killed. Altogether during the height of the anti-NICA movement (in mid-October 1945) over 100 Eurasians, Ambonese, and Menadonese were killed in the Tiga Daerah.[13] Occurring between 11-14 October this violence coincided with

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[11]Interview with a local communist on 18 October 1976.

[12]Personal Communication with the former Japanese vice-resident of Pekalongan, Toshio Ota, dated 10 February 1978.

[13]This figure was calculated after a series of interviews in late 1976 around the sugar factories where most of the killings took place.

outbursts against the Pangreh Praja and against the Chinese. The leaders of local revolutionary struggle groups, the badan perjuangan, the national committees, and local Republican army (TKR) units were powerless to protect officials, Eurasians or Chinese. Neither group had any authority outside the kabupaten capitals in October and the police had in many areas disbanded itself out of fear, as the population disliked the police as much as the Pangreh Praja. Apart from the Eurasians, two subdistrict heads were killed and an unknown number of village headmen, officials and police (also involved in the implementation of the Japanese economic policies), during the social revolution.

An example was the subdistrict head of Lebaksiu in southern Tegal, with a reputation as a notorious 'paddy collector' who had been too 'oppressive' (ceroboh), forcing peasants to deliver all of their harvest during the Occupation. In early October the local national Committee chairman recalls:

> We told the Camat to be calm and that the paddy should be returned (to the people) for the time being as a temporary loan . . . the main point was that the people were hungry, they needed rice, the rice is sitting there, so that settled the matter. We reminded the Camat that the Japanese had obtained the rice by force.[14]

Rather than distribute the rice immediately, pro-authority and bureaucratic to the last, he decided instead to travel 15 kilometers north to consult his immediate superior, the district head. His widow recalls:

> He wanted to go to Slawi to discuss how to make the people less troublesome (muluk) by distributing the rice. We left at 9 a.m. after breakfast. I wanted to see the doctor as I was seven months pregnant. I took along the three youngest of my six children, aged 4, 3 and 2 years. Just outside of Lebaksiu we were stopped. He was killed with bamboo spears. Someone helped us to the house of Haji Nahwawi nearby, where we stayed for the rest of the day. Later we were met by the BKR chief and taken to Tegal. Our belongings were all seized by the people and we never went back to the kecamatan.[15]

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[14]Interview on 10 April 1973.

[15]Interview on 29 January 1973.

Although local KNI leaders say the camat's personal property was saved, a large quantity of soyabeans together with about 300 kilograms of rice thought to have been dishonestly obtained was distributed. The local pawnshop, symbol of the deep rural indebtedness especially since the Depression, was looted by peasant bands. Resentment towards the Chinese flared up as it did elsewhere in the Tiga Daerah during the social revolution, when the same armed bands attacked and plundered 14 Chinese shops in the local market. A local santri, appointed as the new camat, recalls:

> I called all the lurahs and obtained lists of paddy stored in each village. I went around the 15 villages (in the kecamatan) on horseback with two BKR members and a local policeman. The rice was distributed equally and some was given to the pemudas who were responsible for the security. Not one of the 15 villages was short of rice. Everyone was calm because their stomachs were filled. If Suhodo (the former Camat) had given out the rice there wouldn't have been any plundering (penggarongan).[16]

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[16] Interview on 10 April 1973.

Power Struggles in Pekalongan Residency

> 'The kabupaten and municipality of Pekalongan should be brought into line with the Tiga Daerah so the Pekalongan region can continue as one Residency sharing the same ideology.'
>
> The Demand of the Tiga Daerah, 5 December 1945[17]

The struggles for political power and social ascendancy after the overthrow of the bureaucratic elite during the social revolution in Pekalongan residency varied in outcome between regions and between the village, subdistrict/district and kabupaten/residency levels. In this section we will examine more closely the nature of the struggles at these levels, who the main contenders for power were and what the outcome was. The violence of the local upheavals depended on the impact of the wartime depredations, the corruption of the old administration, the intermediary role of the radical prewar pergeraken leadership, and the strength of the rivalries between the local religious elite and the lenggaong--peasant power brokers who for many years had acted on behalf of a growing dispossessed rural poor, and whose livelihood in colonial times had usually come from providing security to various groups within the village as well as from banditry outside it. In nearly all cases where the headman was thrown out, there was a distribution of the old official's personal wealth, paddy from his own lands as well as bengkok being divided, his property sold, and his lands and houses being taken over by the new lurah. The element of oppression and class conflict was more apparent in areas where villages split, with one hamlet section following the rich santri-village priyayi group, the rest following the lenggaongs. Of 115 villages in seven subdistricts researched in the Tiga Daerah, about 80 per cent of headmen were changed. Of those whose backgrounds were known (i.e. remembered), 32 per cent

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[17] See footnote 1.

of the new headmen were from groups within the village which had not held office before, lenggaongs, or perjuangan leaders or peasants (tani).[18]

In the absence of any instructions from above either from the Residency, provincial or central government, local revolutionaries made these changes through organising 'elections' to find local candidates acceptable to all groups. This was easier at the district and subdistrict levels than at the village level where economic and cultural cleavages quickly became apparent. Elections were rather informal affairs but they served their purpose. The following at the village level was typical:

> There were three candidates, each candidate had his own round bamboo cylinder, with his symbol (all leaves) above it. My symbol was turi leaves; Satum (who had been a lurah for 17 months during the Dutch time, but was dismissed for corruption) used janur (young yellow leaf of the coconut palm); and the other candidate used a kluwih leaf. People used short sticks (as ballot papers) which they placed in the cylinder. Everyone in the village could vote.[19]

In many districts and subdistricts, officials as well as members of local national committees were chosen in similar kinds of ways.

At the district/subdistrict level, 97 per cent of officials were changed, the majority of new officials coming from groups which had not had access to the jobs monopolised by the Dutch trained bureaucratic elite during the colonial time, namely the rural Islamic teachers or kyai, and the local nationalists, many of whom were school teachers and KNI leaders. Thus at the subdistrict and district levels the revolutionary struggle took on the nature of a popular movement against the Pangreh Praja.[20]

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[18]See Lucas, 'The Bamboo Spear', Table 7, 204 and Appendix F, 425.

[19]Interview with a village KNI chairman on 5 December 1975.

[20]Lucas, 'The Bamboo Spear', Table 6, 188.

Although Resident Besar ratified the appointment of new officials chosen locally during the social revolution, he himself was finally forced to leave his post after Yogya military headquarters sent out an order for his arrest to the local TKR. His replacement, a high official from the provincial police department who saw himself as no more than a caretaker, ratified the appointment of well-known Muslim leaders as the new bupatis in Tegal and Brebes, and agreed to the setting up of Working Committees (Badan Pekerja) to advise the santri bupatis.

For the next six weeks the Tiga Daerah was largely governed by these Working Committees, dominated by older radical members of the perduangan, and set up on the initiative of local communists, as was the united front, the GBP3D (Federation of Struggle Organisations of the Tiga Daerah). The GBP3D's main priority was seizing political power at the Residency level, and it set about finding a suitable candidate for Resident. Eventually a member of the underground PKI from Purworejo, was chosen. After agreement was reached between the GBP3D, the acting Resident, and Pekalongan perjuangan leaders at a meeting in Pemalang on 9 December, the new Resident was installed in Pekalongan on the following day. In the following four days, local government departments were taken over, finances frozen for auditing, and the GBP3D began suggesting that unpopular local officials be replaced with working committees.

The rise to power of the group of local communists in the Tiga Daerah by early December was due to several factors. While a discussion of the PKI Underground during the Occupation is outside the scope of this paper, the unique position of local communists in Pekalongan was due to the fact that the Illegal PKI had survived in Pemalang until the end of the Occupation, unlike in many other parts of Java. This group had decided at the time of the Proclamation to remain an underground working with local revolutionaries in a broad united front the aim of which was to democratise local government structures. The Pemalang group

had no organisational links with the new PKI of Mr Jusuf founded in neighbouring Cirebon to the west in late October. The choice of well known local Muslim leaders as bupatis in both Tegal and Brebes (in Pemalang the new perjuangan bupati had been closely associated with the underground during the Occupation), allowed the local communists to work through working committees. The creation of working committees in Brebes and Tegal as well as the united front the GBP3D was on the initiative of this group's spokesman and main activist in the Tiga Daerah, K. Midjaja. While in theory local communists wanted to remain in the background in these organisations, in practice they talked openly about Yenan, and saw the Chinese model as being applicable in the Tiga Daerah.[21]

Another factor in the communist success in the Tiga Daerah was the ties of K. Midjaja and Widarta with Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister of Defence and Information in Sjahrir's cabinet at the time. These ties are reflected in the GBP3D's support of Amir's socialist party (PARSI) because, according to K. Midjaja it was 'orientated to Moscow', in a way similar to the prewar Illegal PKI of Musso, to which both K. Midjaja and Widarta had belonged in Surabaya. Also both leaders carried letters introducing them as 'observer' and 'liaison officer' respectively, signed by Amir.[22] In the eyes of local revolutionaries to whom these letters were shown, it was as if the problems in the Tiga Daerah were at last being noticed by the central government. It also helps explain why local Sukarnoist nationalists (such as Kartohargo in Brebes), the veterans of the 1920s PKI and other PNI baru-type socialists joined the Working Committees, the GBP3D, and supported Sardjio as the new Resident of Pekalongan.

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[21] Ibid., 'Minutes of the GBP3D Meeting of 25 November 1945', Appendix H, 433.

[22] 'Surat Pemeriksaan' S. Widarta, 16 February 1946; Question 44, Proces-verbaal K. Midjaja, 16 May 1946, Proc. Gen.

The fate of the radical government in both the Tiga Daerah and Pekalongan lay with Islam and the army which had withdrawn from the Tiga Daerah in early November, and which had been involved in the Semarang front set up to prevent any British expansion to the west of the provincial capital. Muslim groups in Brebes and Tegal were satisfied with the appointment of well known santri leaders as new regional heads or bupatis. Although the Pangreh Praja accepted the new resident at first, santri suspicion turned to opposition after hearing remarks made in a mass meeting by K. Midjaja about Pekalongan pemudas being 'less revolutionary' than in other areas, and the GBP3D emphasizing the importance of revolutionary struggle rather than religion.[23]

In Pemalang where the perjuangan was more united, the modernist (Muhammadiah) orthodox (NU) religious split reinforced social divisions between the elite, the priyayi, who joined Muhammadiah, and the lower classes, including poor santri (santri rakjat) who supported the populist leader Soepangan as bupati. In Tegal the alliance between radicals and Islam was more 'fragile'. The greater influence of orthodox Islam in the rural areas of Tegal was reflected in the large number of kyais chosen during the social revolution to replace Pangreh Praja. While these Moslem officials initially supported a movement whose ideology was 'Independence' (kemerdekaan), after the capture and continued detention the santri commander of the Pekalongan based TKR, K. H. Iskandar Idris while on a reconnaissance trip south of Tegal at the height of the social revolution in early November, they began to grow suspicious. Visits from Pekalongan kyais to speak against the Tiga Daerah to local groups also helped change their views.

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[23] K. Midjaja was reported to have said that 'religion could be put aside' (Boleh disampingkan). Letter from Tegal branch of Indonesian Workers Party, dated 20 December 1945, Proc. Gen.

The element of embattled Islam threatened by a popular uprising became a key element after the GBP3D, in the name of Tiga Daerah, took over the Residency capital and installed Sardjio as Resident. The Muhammadiah batik and textile centre of Pekajangan 8 kilometers south of the Residency capital had been uneasy about the new political leaders from the start and for the past several weeks had also been anxious about the fate of Iskandar Idris, the well known member of their community whom they thought was being 'kept prisoner' in the Tiga Daerah. It was in fact Idris's brother, a Pekajangan teacher, who approached the police for permission to mount a giant demonstration against the radicals and later demanded arms to put down the 'rebellion'.

While the army had initially accepted the new Resident, the mounting Muslim opposition in turn affected the military. The local TKR regiment saw its first priority of manning and supplying the army front west of Semarang as being hampered unnecessarily by road blocks and searches of all vehicles leaving the city. A TKR request for support from the GBP3D was met with the reply that 'the foreign threat was not in Semarang but in Surabaya.'[24] Furthermore at least two TKR officers had Pangreh Praja families imprisoned during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah, while the majority of the officer corps were also from elite backgrounds.[25]

On 14 December the army arrested the new Resident and his followers in Pekalongan. Having imprisoned the Tiga Daerah leaders in Pekalongan, the TKR then quickly realised it had no choice but to launch a full scale counter revolution against the Tiga Daerah, believing in the rumours of an imminent attack from the west to release the Resident and learning of a Presidential visit by Sukarno the

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[24]Pekalongan Public Prosecutor's Report, 19 December 1945.

[25]Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', 350-52.

following week. It was necessary in the TKR view to 'restore order' to the Residency before the Presidential entourage arrived on the last stop of their whistle stop tour of Java.

Three days later in a massive counter revolution or 'clean up operation' (pembersihan) depending on whether one views it from the perspective of the Pangreh Praja and the army, or the revolutionaries, military and militant Muslim units swept through the Tiga Daerah, arresting about 1600 people.[26] While the majority were released fairly quickly, the legal and political battles over the fate of about 30 prisoners dragged on throughout 1946 until finally, in April 1947, 6 remaining revolutionaries, charged with 'attempting to change the structure of government by force', were tried in Pekalongan. The trial was inconclusively adjourned several times, until 1947 when all were released, on an amnesty from President Sukarno.

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[26] Penghela Rakjat, 31 December 1946.

Local Realities versus National Priorities

'Why did the central government tend to support those who did not want to accept the Proclamation of Independence in the region?'

A Tegal Barisan Pelopor pemuda leader[27]

'The Pangreh Praja and heads of government offices who are not able to follow the way of revolution must resign'

Agreement between the Tiga Daerah and Pekalongan[28]

One dilemma resulting from the gulf between local realities and national priorities was that faced by officials like Sarimin the Bupati of Brebes. As long as the Japanese were still in power in Pekalongan Residency, Sarimin, as we have seen, refused to allow the Indonesian flag to be flown in front of government buildings, and was reluctant to support the Proclamation publicly. However after 27 September when the Japanese finally handed over power to the Fuku Shuchokan (vice-resident) Mr Besar '. . . the difficulties being experienced by the regional heads [i.e. the bupatis] of having to submit to two different governments were removed'.[29]

Sarimin's feeling of having to serve 'two masters' was one aspect of the great distinction between national moves and local reality after Independence. In order to present the Republic as a fait accompli to the Allies and the rest of the world, a top priority of the first Republican cabinet was to demonstrate that the government had authority over an orderly population. To this end Sukarno and Hatta were from the start trying to avoid having a dual--i.e. Japanese and Republican--system of administration. As Hatta put it 'orders were issued to

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[27] Marsum Hr., Written answers to questions by author, February 1973.

[28] Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', Appendix I, 440.

[29] Sarimin, Question 15, 'Keterangan', 31 January 1946, Proc. Gen.

every government official to acknowledge himself as an official of the Republic of Indonesia and be ready to accept only orders given him by superiors of Indonesian nationality.[30] At an all-Java Madura conference of the Pangreh Praja which began in Jakarta on 30 August, Sukarno reassured the assembled officials that they would get 'the proper place they deserved' in the new Republic. This referred to the so-called deal worked out between the Pangreh Praja and the national leadership whereby the former would stand behind the Republic provided their positions and status were guaranteed. However it was not until 25 September when all Japanese-appointed officials were formally declared civil servants of the new Republic.[31]

Meanwhile there was a big gap between these aspirations and their actual implementation in Pekalongan Residency. The real problem there was how officials like Sarimin and his Japanese superiors were going to react. Some waited for the Japanese either to acknowledge formally or deny the Proclamation declaration, others believed that according to the terms of the Potsdam agreement the Allies would restore Dutch power. In Pekalongan while the Japanese Assistant Resident, Toshio Ota, supported the Republic, the Kenpeitai clung tenaciously to their arms.

More importantly, the so-called deal between the national level leaders and the Pangreh Praja was only possible because of the position of the older moderate nationalists, a majority in the first republican cabinet. Such a deal was unthinkable in terms of the political realities in the Tiga Daerah, where the older nationalists were the radicals and they did not hold power. This group included the veterans of the 1920s PKI, most of whom were imprisoned in Java or exiled to Boven Digul camp in West New Guinea after the communist rebellion of 1926. It also included the 1930s activists from the pre-war political parties and their

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[30] B. R. O'G. Anderson, 'The Pemuda Revolution, Indonesian Politics 1945-1946' (Cornell University, Ph.D. thesis, 1966), 116, quoting Hatta.

[31] Ibid., 167.

youth affiliates. While active in the various mass organisations set up under the Japanese, in the eyes of the people the important thing was they were not associated with the implementation of the highly unpopular wartime compulsory rice deliveries and rationing policies, although some were involved in the 'receiving end' of romusha projects.

Even if the Japanese had transferred power earlier in Pekalongan Residency and the Resident had been able to declare himself for the Republic on 5 instead of 27 September (like Mr Iskaq the pergerakan Resident of Banyumas to the south had done), such moves would not have prevented the growing polarisation between the revolutionary movement and the Pangreh Praja.

This polarisation must be seen in the context of the growing isolation all groups felt in the Tiga Daerah, if not the Residency. Feeling on their own (none of the Pangreh Praja informants remembered the national conference between their spokesmen and the national leaders, or recalled anyone attending from Pekalongan) without instructions from above, super cautious and bureaucratic from their Dutch training, they waited and waited for non-existing orders which never came. We have seen what happened to one Camat who refused to deliver or distribute the rice to people in his subdistrict without orders from his superiors. While various local groups had links with 'national-level' figures, these were on a personal not an organisational basis. Although local struggle groups took names such as API, AMRI or PRI, these were simply borrowed from glamour groups in the bigger cities, without there being any organisational links. As we have seen local communists were linked to Amir Sjarifuddin and his PARSI rather than to the PKI or Mr Jusuf in neighbouring Cirebon. In Tegal various Sjahrir-type socialists had links with Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the last PNI baru chairman and a close associate of the Prime Minister, who had lived in Tegal from the late 1930s and been active in Pekalongan during the Occupation. Others had links with Supeno,

a leading figure in Sjahrir's Socialist Party and a member of the Working Committee of the KNIP (the national parliament).

This political isolation was reflected in--indeed may have been one result of--a great sense of physical isolation, which members of the perjuangan recall today about this early period of the Revolution. Although there was contact with Jakarta via couriers for a time after the Proclamation, after the social revolution had swept away the old order in Pemalang on the night of 19 October 1945, communication between the three kabupaten which made up the Tiga Daerah and the Residency capital of Pekalongan to the east were cut; while post offices remained open there was apparently no mail from outside the Tiga Daerah, at least according to Kartohargo recalling events of the early revolution in Brebes only a year later. Few people dared travel the roads for fear of the rural unrest. The Residency's two local newspapers Pelita Rakjat in Tegal and Pantjaran Nasional in Pekalongan must have been the only source of 'outside' news.[32] The Brebes perjuangan leader complained that he was often too busy to listen to the radio as well.

One of the main problems facing moderate nationalists such as Kartohargo was how to make the local national committees more effective. Indeed from the beginning it was never clear what their role should be. Some were appointed by local officials, others chosen in genuine local elections, some had political and economic functions, and many KNI leaders became village headmen, subdistrict and district heads. While their effectiveness depended on the charisma of the local chairman, many of whom were well known kyai or Muslim teachers, with no arms or security force they could not stop the violence or protect officials' lives or property. By the end of October there was no sign of a political solution to

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[32] No copies of these newspapers seem to have survived.

the social revolution in Brebes. The Bupati, his deputy (Patih) and two district heads (Wedana) had been kidnapped on 18 October and local government was thrown into chaos. Kartohargo decided he should get advice from the centre, and together with a former public prosecutor left Brebes for Jakarta to visit the Ministry of Social Affairs, where the two revolutionaries hoped to get some 'explanation about how to stop the unrest in Brebes'. However instead in true bureaucratic style they were 'referred' to the Home Affairs Ministry. Officials there explained that their problem could only be solved by the local Brebes KNI because 'the centre had not had the chance to work out a solution'. After the Ministry of Information had asked the two leaders about the situation in Brebes, they were sent off by Home Affairs with a letter to the Governor of Central Java in Semarang the provincial capital. At the governor's office, 'I was told to wait for instructions from above which would be issued as soon as possible. After the Magelang affair had been dealt with Brebes would get its turn'.[33] Magelang was the farthest south the British were to advance in central Java and the scene of fierce fighting which subsided after Sukarno and Hatta flew there for negotiations with the British.

The fact that the central government never did get around to thinking about the social revolution in Tiga Daerah, was because there was no anti-Dutch or anti-Allied fighting going on at all in Pekalongan Residency. The only foreign military presence was the one day visit of an English major who came with some Indian soldiers from Semarang on 27 October, to observe the place of detention of foreigners (i.e. Eurasians and Dutch).[34] It was not until July 1947 that in the wake of the First Clash Dutch military units occupied Pekalongan Residency.

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[33]Kartohargo, Question 5, Proces-verbaal, 15 January 1947, Proc. Gen.

[34]Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1 November 1945.

Attitudes of the National Leadership to the Tiga Daerah 'Rebellion'

'The Tiga Daerah was not a social revolution, it was an anti-Pangreh Praja and police revolt'

Subadio Sastrosatomo, BP-KNIP leader[35]

'It was a confused movement (gerakan tidak beres)'

Dr Sudarsono, Minister of Social Affairs[36]

One response by the centre to the social revolutions in the regional areas, was a Political Announcement signed by Sukarno-Hatta on 27 October. Still warning the people that acting by themselves would only result in anarchy, demands to replace local officials should be 'made via the government or with the mediation of the national committees as the temporary representative of the people'.[37] By this time the entire government apparatus at the district and subdistrict levels in the Tiga Daerah was in disarray, and as we have seen, the local national committees, as well as the police, had ceased to function. All the Tegal KNI could do for officials who felt their lives were threatened early in November was suggest they move to the only safe place remaining, the local jail.

The offer to mediate between the Tiga Daerah and the Residency capital from such a well known nationalist as Sajuti Melik, who was also Sukarno's personal secretary, would have improved relations with the centre and shown that the provincial level at least (he came from Semarang as the governor's envoy), was concerned about local level affairs. However Sajuti Melik through no fault of his own, found his task hampered by ideological differences. Having been a communist and a member of the illegal PKI in Semarang in the '30s he had then converted to

[35]Interview, 25 July 1972.

[36]Interview, 30 November 1971.

[37]Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan Undang², peraturan² penetapan² penetapan² pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 1945 revised ed. (Djakarta, Seno, 1951), 68.

the national-communism of Tan Malaka, for which local communists and former party comrades in Pekalongan had never forgiven him. Nevertheless the army withdrew from the Tiga Daerah in early November, 'to avoid bloodshed' at his urging, meanwhile the barracks were attacked when Tegal itself was taken over by the people on 4 November, in the hunt for hidden Pangreh Praja.

Sjahrir also had harsh words for the Pangreh Praja in his influential revolutionary pamphlet Our Struggle, writing that they were nothing more than the 'henchmen of the colonialists' and 'an instrument fashioned by Dutch colonialism from the feudal heritage of our society', and he envisaged that they would be gradually eased out of their positions.[38] While this attitude was reflected in his government's replacement of officials who had cooperated with the Japanese, his reformism stopped well short of supporting social revolution. Furthermore it was always tempered in Sjahrir's mind with what he saw as the need to attract the sympathy of the western powers for Indonesia's struggle. The insistence by Amir Sjarifuddin and others on '. . . presenting an appearance of ordered democracy to the outside world drove them in specific cases to side with the old pangreh praja against social revolution'.[39]

The implications of Sjahrir's attitude became clear when he came to Pekalongan at the end of a whistle stop tour of Java in late December 1945. Before this the government had sent a delegation of four Socialist Party leaders, including two ministers, to Pekalongan residency to try and mediate between the Tiga Daerah and the residency capital. In Pekalongan they were to explain to the Pangreh Praja that as a 'people's movement' the Tiga Daerah had the central government's

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[38]Our Struggle, translated with an introduction by Benedict Anderson (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968), 26.

[39]Anthony Reid, Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950 (Melbourne, Longman, 1974), 74.

support 'and to Tiga Daerah leaders in Pemalong, that Sjahrir wasn't supporting feudalism but could not tolerate the lawlessness of the social revolution'.[40]

When Sjahrir, Sukarno, Hatta, and the presidential entourage arrived in Pekalongan on 22 December to find the communist Resident, his staff, the entire leadership of both the GBP3D and the revolutionary movements throughout the Tiga Daerah, in jail in Pekalongan, the army's counter-revolution was not reversed. Nothing was said in public at all. All that happened was that the TKR commander was called up and asked to explain the army's action. In a speech Sjahrir complained that he had more difficulties in dealing with Pekalongan than with the international world, and went on to express disapproval of the local struggle using an analogy with building materials. There were two kinds, said Sjahrir, those which passed the quality test and those which did not. 'It was as if Pekalongan had not passed the test' recalls an official present.[41] In Sjahrir's view, the transfer of power which passed the quality test was a peaceful and orderly one. Gracefully replacing a Japanese-appointed official was one thing, violent social upheaval quite another.

Sukarno is not on record as referring to the Tiga Daerah in Pekalongan either. Only in the return to Jakarta did he refer in Tegal to the 'Talang state', suggesting in his view that the social revolution was a separatist movement. From the long drawn out legal and political battles throughout 1946 and early 1947, culminating finally in the court trial in Pekalongan in April 1947, and ending with an amnesty for the six political prisoners on 21 July 1947, the ambiguity in the attitude of the central government is apparent. The Revolution could not decide how it should view the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah.

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[40]Subadio Sastrosatomo, interview, 7 August 1972.

[41]Pekalongan Assistant Resident, transcript of taped interview, 30 July 1973.

The view of the majority in the national level leadership was echoed by Hatta, who was quoted in December 1945 by the right-of-centre journalist Rosihan Anwar in the newspaper Merdeka in December 1945 as saying that there was 'too much popular sovereignty' in Pekalongan Residency. The people could not get rid of the Pangreh Praja just like that, said Hatta, only the government had that right.[42] These sentiments were echoed by the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor and the Attorney General whose case against the revolutionaries rested on article 106 of the Criminal Code 'attempting to change the structure of government by force' (Makar). The Attorney General's determination to prosecute revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah as 'rebels' was also affected by the '3 July Affair' which clearly influenced views at the centre on how to punish social revolutionaries. The whole of the government's case was based on the fine distinction between righteous revolution and criminality. Up until November 1945, popular actions by the people against officials would be considered 'pure' (tetap dianggap suci) and pardonable, but after November 1945 they would be considered as criminal offences.

Aftermath

The social revolution of October-December 1945 saw the complete overthrow of the bureaucratic elite (the priyayi class) in the Tiga Daerah. The old order had gone for good. The TKR counter revolution in mid-December did not reestablish the Pangreh Praja in their former positions, it removed the radicals from the local administrations, and disbanded the Working Committees. However by this time the central government had formed representative councils (DPR) at the kabupaten level and these continued to advise the Muslim bupatis in Tegal at least. The fact that the old order could not be reestablished was clearly seen in

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[42] Quoted by Anwar in Merdeka, 29 December 1946. (I am grateful to Ben Anderson for his notes of this article on the Tiga Daerah by Rosihan Anwar.)

the fate of the next Resident Soemitro Kolopaking a former bupati from an old Banyumas priyayi family, who tried to replace Muslims chosen during the social revolution with former Pangreh Praja. Local opposition to this return to the status quo led to the centre having to find a fourth Resident in as many months. This time Wali al'Fatah the most prominent radical national Muslim leader at the national level and a MASJUMI vice chairman was chosen. With the replacement of the Bupati of Pemalang (arrested by the TKR) by a local kyai, the ascendancy of Islam in Pekalongan Residency continued until after the First Clash, when two of the santri bupatis (Brebes and Pemalang) were shot by the Dutch during the guerrilla war in 1948.

The Pangreh Praja after 1946 renamed by the central government Pamong Praja (leaders i.e. not rulers of the people) thrown out during the social revolution were in most cases reappointed to jobs either in the civilian police or autonomous towns elsewhere in Central Java. Some willingly or otherwise worked for the Dutch in areas of the north coast occupied after the First Clash, while others (such as the bupati of Brebes) whose experiences during the social revolution had made them staunch republicans, refused, and set up local republican governments-in-exile in the mountains near Wonosobo to the south.

At the district/subdistrict levels the kyais elected during the social revolution stayed in office until after the revolution when many transferred to local departments of religious affairs in the kabupaten towns. The local nationalist leaders chosen by the people in 1945 usually made careers in the civil service after 1950, as did some of the badan perjuangan leaders as well. The 'opening up' of the civil service at the local levels was thus an important result of the social revolution. At the village level, nearly all the new headmen stayed in office until after the revolution, some until the upheaval of 1965.

The power struggle between the perjuangan and the Pangreh Praja in the Tiga Daerah was more than just a struggle for the positions of the latter. It was not just 'new wine in old wineskins' or old structures filled with new people. Of course in the colonial context of the total monopoly of these jobs by the elite this in itself would have been no small achievement. Local revolutionaries clearly saw that the structures themselves had to change. To make local government administrative structures more democratic meant giving greater participation to the people through the creation of representative councils at all levels. Many local leaders had seen first the local KNIs and then the working committees in the Tiga Daerah which replaced them as also attempting to share the bureaucratic power of the old elite.

Rather than just a struggle for political ascendancy, the social revolution was a cultural revolution, an attempt to overthrow for good the dominant ethos and value system of the Javanese elite and replace it with a more egalitarian, less hierarchical system. In the Javanese context this meant firstly the rejection of language hierarchy or speech levels. Aristocratic forms and titles along with high Javanese were abolished and people were encouraged to speak in the more democratic Indonesian or low Javanese. This was a radical move in the Javanese context. During the colonial period the elite used high Javanese to maintain social hierarchy and also to restore order and stability in village situations which appeared 'insecure'. The rejection of this powerful social hierarchy surmounted by the Pangreh Praja during the social revolution was also reflected in the plays put on by the perjuangan in Pemalang and Brebes in the dombreng rituals for unmasking corrupt officials in the preference for complete equality in the distribution of rice and cloth, and in the ethos of the youthful activists, the pemuda.[43]

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[43]For a fuller discussion of the revolutionary ethod in Pekalongan residency see Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', 244-63.

THE RESIDENCY OF PEKALONGAN



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RUIM

OUVRIR ICI / HIER OPENEN

Tollensstraat 4
2282 BM Rijswijk
Jun 17 '82

Dear Anton

It was good getting your note & the chronology & to hear that you were nearly finished your chapter, tho' progress had been slower than anticipated.

I heard unofficially that they weren't going to let me into Indonesia (no, I had not asked for anything other than a tourist / social visa), tho' why I've no idea. Possibly some personal spite towards George, I suppose. Anyway, I cut my losses, and will be spending the next two months in the archives here. I'll also hope to get the Regional Dimension book into some shape, & try to work out a timetable for getting it to a publisher. I'd therefore welcome your chapter as soon as you can get it to me. (My date of departure from here will be March 12) & I'll arrive in Ithaca about a week later).

I'm just sending this to Australia, as your 6 weeks in Yogya must be about over now. Hope your work went well

Ever

Audrey.

Cornell University

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Dr. Anton Lucas
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July 31, 1981

Dear Anton:

Yet again, a much longer gap than I intended between my communications to you. I hope, however, that we can now proceed with getting a draft of the proposed book ready. Certainly at the pace I have been going over the past few months I could not realistically hope to get a manuscript in reasonable shape to present to a publisher before the early months of next year (say February?) Would a mid-September deadline therefore seem possible to you for a revised draft of your piece?

In addition to the four conference papers Michael van Langenberg would like to contribute to the book, and also Mike Williams is still interested. I'm thinking of inviting a graduate student who is completing a dissertation on Ambon in Amsterdam to contribute as well, which would give something of a different perspective. (If you have any strong recommendations for another possible contribution do let me know; Aceh is an obvious gap, as I do not really believe that Eric Morris will come up with a piece now--he has got too involved I think with UNHCR work in Geneva to get something completed within a necessarily limited period.)

It looks, therefore, as if the book will consist of six to seven regional sections, plus an introduction and conclusion. I would hope that the individual sections would not exceed about 25 to 30 double spaced pages. I enclose a rough outline of some of the major issues that I hope the individual sections could deal with. I do not wish to impose too rigid a format on these, but also do not wish them to bear no relation to one another. Certainly the historical and social background of the region, the nature of the leadership during these years and local perceptions of the "revolution" are all themes that would need to be addressed. I also enclose some specific comments and suggestions with regard to your own piece, as of necessity it will have to differ somewhat from the treatment given to the others. I'll welcome your reactions to all this, and also to the three pages of comments (not revised) that Takashi Shiraishi made on the papers presented at the conference. I think these are very helpful in rethinking the issues raised by the original pieces.

I'll be looking forward to hearing from you, and I will try to keep you more regularly posted as things proceed.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Audrey

Audrey Kahin

988 Cayuga Heights Road
Ithaca, New York 14850

January 29, 1981

Dear Anton:

I feel badly at being so slow in getting back to you with my comments, particularly as just settling in to a new position at Flinders is not the time when you probably feel like concentrating on the article, and also when I'm going to have to ask you to let me have your reactions as soon as possible so that I can get the paper into the AAS for duplication by the end of the month. If you want to send me the changes you want to make, I can arrange to have the piece retyped here and sent in, so at least you can avoid that chore.

I'm afraid I heard finally from the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and there is no way they can support your travel* to the conference, nor have any of the other people I have tried come up with any useful suggestions. If by some miracle you are able to get sufficient funding almost to make it, do let me know, and I might be able to raise the odd hundred or so, but I'm afraid that is the most I could probably manage if you were not able to come to Cornell. I'm afraid all universities and governments, with the exception of the Japanese seem to be cutting back on funds for conferences, so I'm afraid the panel is going to be real small; I'm now planning to give a paper myself, as Michael van Langenburg has had his fund requests turned down; and I am anything but sanguine about Michael Williams. I'll let you know how it finally turns out. At least there should be good discussion, and Barbara Harvey's paper also is good -- so there will be a geographical distribution with Sulawesi, West Sumatra, and the Tiga Daerah, (and possibly Banten).

I hope by now you would have got some suggestions at least from Takashi; he is snowed with work apparently as a junior faculty member at Tokyo University, but he promised he would try to write you something concrete soon. I hope my enclosed suggestions are also of some help, and I'll look forward to your reaction soon. Also further news on your plans, and if you're not able to make it, perhaps a summary of oral remarks, that someone could give for you (I'm thinking of asking Ben to stand in for you if you can't make it, as he is the only other person I know who knows much about the affair, and he thinks very highly of your work.)

With best wishes, and again apologies forthe delay,

Audrey

* as you are a "non-Canadian living outside Canada"

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Comments & Suggestions on Anton Lucas' "The 'Tiga Daerah'Affair of 1945"

Practically all my suggestions come with regard to the first 17 pages of the paper and most are aimed at making a rather complicated situation more comprehensible to a reader with little background in the history of the period. After that, I think your analysis is excellent, and it is the thrust of what is said there that would provide an interesting focus for the discussions.
I'll just go through page by page commenting on what I think should be altered and why.

p.1 I would argue that the sentence beginning"Unless we try etc," be moved to come at the bottom of the page after unnoticed. In the first sentence of the second para I would take out "despite Smail's early work" and I would bring the last two sentences together to read: "The complexities of the Revolution and its internal dynamics at the local (that is the Residency level and below) have tended to be glossed over and the views of the rank and file revolutionaries have gone unnoticed." Then to:"Unless we try to understand what local participants....." to the end of that sentence.
p.2 It is difficult for the reader to know here if there is any difference between the "social revolution" and the "tiga Daerah Affair" I dont know if you are going to try to differentiate between the two; if you are, you need to do so here. If not, I would argue that the first para should read: "The 'Tiga Daerah' (Three Regions) Affair or "social revolution" occurred in the kabupaten (regencies) of Brebes, Tegal, and Pemalang in Pekalongan residency in north central Java in 1945. Its origins, the nature of its leadership, and why it ended the way it did have been and are still much debated in Indonesia today. In particular, the actual nature of the social revolution has remained obscure, as well as how it "fitted in" to the wider dimension...."

p.2 second part of the paragraph: I dont think this is the time to go into logistical and source difficulties in the main part of the text -- it just diverts the reader's attention from what is of interest in what you're saying. I would therefore suggest that all the material from "For various reasons..." to "...tell their stories" be made a footnote
p.2 bottom paragraph. I would substitute "one of the factors distinguishing" for "what I think distinguishes". and I would remove"well documented"
p.4 the top of this page is unclear: where were the Republican residents appointed; (other parts of Java); ? what was Pekalong excluded from? Do you mean: No one was appointed in Pekalongan?

p.4. Your second paragraph is also somewhat confused, and I think needs spelling out. I would suggest something on the lines of: "The lack of a strong openly pro-Republican leadership at the top of the Residency bureaucracy did nothing to convince other officials who were sitting on the fence to take a firm stand on the side of the Republic. They refused to distribute the surplus rice lying unused from the last harvest in stockpiles all over the Tiga Daerah --part of the forced deliveries from the peasants under the Japanese program of economic self-sufficiency for all occupied regions. While the role of the Pangreh Praja as agents for the Japanese in implementing and policing these forced rice deliveries was the main reason for their unpopularity...." And the sentence 6 lines from the bottom I would change to "Certain officials were also notorious as romusha raisers.7"

On page 5 I've made a number of editorial changes, principally for clarity. The first line I would suggest changing to read"Republican Resident Besar's authority...." I would suggested that the second sentence read: "While in Tegal, the local KNI had negotiated this transfer with only one casualty, bloody fighting broke out in the residency capital of Pekalongan on October 3 during the Resident's negotiations for the arms transfer, and ended with...."I'd also split the next sentence into two, so that the final sentence would read: "The subsequent transport of the remaining Japanese civilians and soldiers south to Banyumas,....authority in Pekalongan residency, and it became the first..."

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p.7. I found it very confusing here to have the elections thrown in, and no indication given of the types of successful candidates emerging from them, particularly as a few pages on you refer to the new officials as if we knew the groups from whom they were now drawn. I would suggest that you leave out of here the section beginning "In the absence..." right down to Were chosen in similar [kinds of] ways." and insert this at the top of page 13 after "perjuangan leaders or peasants (tani))"

[I think in this first section in trying to give a full picture you go too far ahead of your reader's understanding, so that I would suggest that that paragraph go later and also that the section end at the bottom of page 9, with the material from pp.10-11 incorporated into the following section where it is explained and where people can then understand what is happening. The Section starting on p.3 would then show the ~~breakdown~~ removal of the former administrators, and the other groups against whom the people acted, and explanations of the creation of a new administration and thepower struggles would come in the following section.]

pp.7-8.I'd change this to read: "Soon after NICA (...)representatives had landed in Jakarta with the British on September 29, rumors of NICA atrocities began reaching the Tiga Daerah via railway , telegraph, and telephone. By early October an anti-NICA movement had gained momentum in the region, and on October 11 violence broke out as the people rounded up Eurasians near local sugar mills, accused them, of..."
I'd change the sentence after footnote 13 to read: "Occurring between 11-14 October this violence coincided with the outbursts against the Pangreh Praja and against the Chinese."

THen, as I said above I'd end the section at the bottom of p.9. I'll just go now through your section starting p.12 and say where I think the material from pp.10-11 could be inserted.
p.12 would remain as stands
p.13 I'd insert the material on the elections after line two as indicated above.
I would then insert after the para ending"Pangreh Praja 22" (i.e. before the para ~~being~~ beginning "The rise to power") the part of p.10 which begins "Although ratifying..' right down to the end of the first sentence of the second paragraph, which ends ".... officials with working committees." I'd also suggest changing the first two sentences of this page to read: "Although Resident Besar ratified the appointment of new officials chosen locally during the social revolution, he himself was finally forced to leave his post after Yogyakarta military headquarters sent out an order for his arrest to the local TKR. His replacement, a high official from the provincial civilian police department who saw himself as no more than a caretaker, ratified the appointment of well known local Muslim leaders as the new bupatis in Tegal and Brebes...."
on p.14 line 8 from the bottom: between "..or bupatis" and "In Pemalang..." I would insert the sentence from p.10 which begins " Although the Pangreh Praja accepted..." and ending "..rather than religion.17"
At the top of page 15, I would combine the first sentence there with the sentence at the top of page 11, which begins "Muslim leaders.." and ends "...some weeks earlier."
After the first para on page 15 I would start the second para with the last sentence on page 10, beginning "The mounting muslim opposition..." This would mean the present next sentence on page 15 would need some adjusting .
Then after the present footnote 25 on p.15. "On 14 December the army arrested the new Resident and his followers in Pekalongan. Having imprisoned these leaders, the ~~Tiga Dae~~ TKR then quickly realized...." Then after "..whistle stop tour of Java." at top of p.16 I'd insert the sentence on p.11 beginning "Three days later...1600 people."
I'm not sure whether the balance of the page should go there, or perhaps on p.25 in the section on the aftermath.
I understand why you did it the way you did, but I do think some of these reorganization suggestions would make it easier for your readers to understand what happened and the forces involved.

From then on it's fine A.

Cornell University

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 607/256-4359
102 West Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14850

January 15, 1981

Dear Anton:

I've been holding off writing in the hope of hearing something from the people from whom I'd requested funds for you. However, I've heard nothing, so I fear the chances are pretty poor.

I enclose the notice from the AAS regarding time and place for thepanel. If you think there is a chance of your making it, and you will need any special equipment please let me know, and I'll request it.

I've read your paper with great interest; the parallels and contrasts with the situation in West Sumatra are striking; it's going to be interesting to see how the other areas are portrayed. I'm afriad I've been awfully busy recently, and I haven't had time to work out coherent comments; however, I really will try to get some to you shortly. I think, however, that probably as it stands the paper could be duplicated for distribution at the AAS, and if you could work out a summary of the major points you are making, either Takashi or I could read these, if you are not able to make it. We could then send notes of the discussion to you, as well as comments from the other participants. I'm hoping however, that someone you'll still be able to make it.

I've sent out two cables to the Michaels whose papers have not yet arrived. Barbara is circulating her outline, and is hoping to have the full paper to me in a few days. That too should be sent on to you. I hope this reaches you before you leave for Flinders.

Ever,

Audrey

P.S. I think I'd better send this to Flinders, considering how tardy the mail is at the moment, and I doubt you'll need equipment

The University of Sydney

N.S.W. 2006

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE: Indonesian & Malayan Studies

TELEPHONE: 692 1122.

DX 1154

21/1/81

Dear Anton,

This is a rather hurried note to say that my hopes of getting to the Toronto conference have suddenly taken a nose-dive. The problem is that most basic one of all – money. – As it stands now the difference between airfares & available travel funds here has ruled out any chance of my going. I have written & told Audrey of the difficulty. What about yourself? Will you make it? Many thanks for your draft paper – I will send some comments soon. If Audrey can't get a replacement for me & the panel is still going ahead I will at least send my paper over for discussion.

Congratulations on getting the Flinders job. Let us know if you have any plans for visiting Sydney.

Give my regards to Keith Foulcher.

All the best

Michael van Langenberg.

ELMIRA, NY 149
PM
8 DEC
1980

PLEASE MAIL EARLY FOR CHRISTMAS

USA 22c

Dr. Anton Lucas
Department of History
The University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland
New Zealand

AEROGRAMME VIA AIRMAIL PAR AVION

(2) Second fold

Kahin, CMIP
102 West Avenue
Ithaca, N.Y.14850

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Additional message area

December 5, 1980

Dear Anton:

Just a note to thank you for your letter of the 19th, and to let you know that your paper has arrived safely. I'm looking forward very much to reading it. I have just made a copy and sent it off to Takashi Shiraishi, and I'll let him know your new address as of February 1. Do you want it to go to any of the others at this stage -- if so, are you able to send it to them or should I do so? I'll write to you further as soon as I've had a chance to read it, and thanks so much for being so prompt in getting it to me.

Congratulations on the job; I can see it must have been difficult making the decision, but I think you made the right choice.

I gave your regards to Ben -- we're all hoping you will make it to Toronto, even if Ithaca is now impossible.

I'll be writing again soon.

Sincerely,

Audrey

ELMIRA, NY 149
PM
11 DEC
1980

22c

Dr. Anton Lucas
Department of History
University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland
New Zealand

AEROGRAMME VIA AIRMAIL PAR AVION

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A.Kahin,CMIP
102 West Avenue
Cornell University
Ithaca,N.Y.14850

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Additional message area

December 9, 1980

Dear Anton:

Another brief note, which will probably cross with another one from you. Have just received your disappointing note regarding travel funds from Flinders. Let us not yet give up hope. I'll be trying a few long shots over here to see if I can come up with anything. I've just written off to the Office of International Relations of the Social Science & Humanities Research Council of Canada in your behalf, hoping that perhaps the Commonwealth Connection might mean something. (That is just a shot in the dark.) I'll also try the Indonesia Council of the AAS, though the AAS itself has been quite specific that it will not provide funds. Perhaps something will work out. (Don't quite understand about the Adelaide-Sydney return -- sorry, of course I do; I was mixing up Auckland and Adelaide.) I'll keep you informed of progress or lack of it.

Takashi will have got two copies of your paper, but I doubt he will object. I'll write you with regard to your paper next week or soon. I'm hoping I'll be getting some others in the near future.

Ever

Audrey.

Cornell University

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 607/256-4359
102 West Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14850

October 4, 1981

Dear Anton:

A brief note in response to your letter of September 21, which arrived at the end of last week. First, I'm delighted you are still going to be able to go ahead on your chapter. End of October is fine. I'll be leaving here on the 31st, for about four months away in Indonesia and the Netherlands, I hope, ~~xx~~ and I'll be working on the papers while I'm away, so if it looks as if yours wont reach me here before I leave, I'll be spending a week in England on my way out, and you could send it there: c/o Richey 21 St Ann's Road, Barnes, London S.W.13. (I'll be leaving there November 12 for Bangkok.)

Thanks for your suggestion of Nazaruddin; however, I had felt I should give Eric Morris the opportunity of declining, but he telephoned ~~by~~ me from Geneva, very keen to participate, and he has promised a paper by the end of the month, so I feel obliged to remain with him unless this again falls through. However, I'll keep Nazaruddin Syamsuddin's address with me, and ~~if~~ I'll get in touch with him should other plans fall through. Thanks again for inquiring on this.

Mike Williams is promising a paper now, and I hope to see him and Robert Cribb when I'm in London early next month. Also Richard Chauvel, who is finishing his thesis on Ambon has promised a piece by the end of the month, so if all these materialize, I think we're going to have a good book.

Congratulations on the birth of your son, Darma, and I'll be looking forward to hearing from you again soon.

With best wishes,

Audrey

MEL UDARA
PAR AVION

SURAT UDARA
AIR LETTER
AEROGRAMME

Air Mail

LEKAT

Dr. Anton Lucas

c/o Rini Sampurno

Nyutran MgIII/40,

Yogyakarta

Indonesia

Mula2 lipat di-sini — First fold here

Kemudian lipat di-sini — Second fold here

Nama dan 'alamat Pengirim:
Sender's name and address:

Federal Hotel

Rm.412

Federal Hotels Sdn. Bhd. P.O.Box896

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA.
TEL: 489166 & 488144 CABLE: "FEDEROTEL"

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Form approved by the Postmaster General, Malaysia No. F. 14

Answered 28/12

Federal Hotel
KUALA LUMPUR-MALAYSIA.
P.O.Box 896

Room 412

December 5, 1981

Dear Anton:

Thanks for your note of November 4. I'm sorry I did not respond before --it arrived just before I left England--but my plans were hazy, and I didn't know what to tell you. I8m now stuck here for at least two weeks, as the consulate says they have to refer my visa application to Jakarta, and it'll be that long before they get a response. If you've got your piece with you, I'd therefore be grateful ~~xx~~ if you could send it to me here. (George will be here till at least the beginning of January, so if I do get in earlier he'll be able to forward it on to me.)

I'll be spending all my time in Sumatra, and not going to Jakarta I think, so I doubt if we'll see each other, though should there be a chance of your getting to Bukittinggi (or Kuala Lumpur) do let me know. I've got BarbaraHarvey's and Robert Cribb's revised pieces, and Eric Morris's should have arrived in London after I ~~fax~~ left. The others are promised by the end of this month.

I'll look forward to hearing from you.

Ever,

Audrey.

Membuka-nya potong di-sini — To open cut here
Membuka-nya potong di-sini — To open cut here

Cornell University

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 607/256-4359
102 West Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14853x0

April 8, 1982

Dear Anton:

I've been waiting for your piece to arrive, realizing that you've been awfully busy between Indonesia and Australia. However, I do hope that you have managed to finish it. It is the one piece I haven't seen at least in draft (except for one on Ambon, which is supposedly in the mail), and I would like to be moving ahead on the whole book pretty soon. As yours will be in effect a second draft, after the paper for the conference, I have not worried much, but hope now that I can receive it soon and get some idea of how it fits in to the framework of the book as a whole.

Hope your trip to Indonesia went well. I was disappointed not to get there, though I heard after getting to Holland that a visa finally came through for me. Anyway, my time went well in Holland, where I also saw Michael van Langenberg who a week ago was able to send his chapter on East Sumatra and Tapanuli; I got a draft of Michael Williams' too while I was in London.

Will be looking forward to hearing from you.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Audrey

Audrey Kahin

988 Cayuga Heights Road
Ithaca, New York 14850

November 18, 1980

Dr. Anton Lucas
Department of History
The University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland, New Zealand

Dear Anton:

Further to my letter of October 19, I do hope that you have received good news with regard to the possibility of a permanent lecutreship in Australia. I will look forward to hearing as soon as you have definite information. If it should fall through, I will be happy to do all I can at this end to help raise funds for you to make a trip to the U.S. and Candadx Canada for the conference; there might be something more than the $150 + round trip Toronto-Ithaca that I could manage, if I made a few applications in your behalf. Takashi has heard definitely that he has a grant for the trip from Japan, and I gather that it is all right for Michael van Langenberg, and definitely Barbara Harvey. Michael Williams is having a little difficulty, but will probably be able to raise the necessary funding, or most of it. I heard from Eric Morris that he probably will not be able to attend because he is being transferred from Jakarta to Geneva, and the difficulties of moving his family at short notice, will make it unlikely that he will be able to make a further trip to the U.S. with them. There is still a possibility that he might attend, however.

I enclose the forms I sent in to the AAS at the beginning of this month, listing the paper titles and the addresses of the participants. It will probably be easiest if you send copies of your paper directly to the other participants, rather than my duplicating and sending copies off from here. With regard to the original draft, I'd be grateful if you would send a copy to Takashi as well as myself, even if you do not wish to circulate your paper at that stage to all your fellow participants.

I'll be looking forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Audrey

988 Cayuga Heights Road
Ithaca, New York 14850

October 19, 1980

Dr. Anton Lucas
Department of History
The University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland
New Zealand

Dear Anton:

Thank you for your letter of October 5, and I can well understand the uncertain position you are in at the moment. Your title is fine, and dont worry about your paper not covering the complete time span that the others might be. That is not the point of the exercise -- the perspective that you will be bringing in is an extremely important one, and the contrasts and similarities between the"social revolution" or"rebellion" there, and those occurring at the same time or later in other regions will, I think, be one of the more valuable things coming out of the panel.

I will go ahead and list you as a panel participant, and your paper amongst those that will be given, and keep my fingers crossed that you will be able to attend in person. If you find that you cannot finally make it to the conference, I'll be very sorry, but it is difficult to plan these things so far ahead particularly at this stage in your career and from the other side of the world. However, we will still circulate your paper, and send the other papers to you for your comments, even if you wont be able to come. May I just impress upon you to join the AAS and register for the conference, by the 27th October or else the Administration of the AAS wont allow you or your paper to participate.

It's great that you have the chance of a permanent lectureship in Asian Studies in Australia -- at which University? Good luck with the application. How soon do you think you'll be able to get a draft of your paper in? Yes, my thesis is available from University Microfilms --though I'm afraid I have mislaid its number, but I dont think you need that.

I'll be looking forward to hearing from you as soon as you know definitely with regard to your participation. But dont worry about it too much; I'll just go ahead on the assumption that you'll be able to make it.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Audrey

Audrey Kahin

P.S. I'll list your affiliation still as the University of Auckland, and I'm afraid that it will appear so in the Program, but that cant be helped if you're elsewhere by then. It might interest you that Michael van Langenberg writes re his paper: "I anticipate the final paper will examine 'national integration' and 'revolution' in the context of 3 sets of events in the region, namely 'social revolution,' civil war and movements for regional autonomy."

988 Cayuga Heights Road
Ithaca, New York 14850

September 14, 1980

Dear Anton:

Enclosed please find the letter I'm sending to all participants and the memorandum from the AAS. I was very pleased they accepted the proposal, and I do hope it is going to prove possible for you to participate. Now that it's official, I'll see if I can get any financial help for you here, but I think the very most I could hope would be to get an honorarium of about $150 for you if you were willing to give a talk here, plus a round trip air fare only between Toronto and Ithaca, or New York and Ithaca. However, I'll ask around and see if I can hear of any other possibilities, though there is virtually no chance of this, I think. Keep me informed as to how your own search goes.

Please do let me know as soon as possible as to a title for your paper, and also how you want your academic affiliation listed. Any general suggestions with regard to the panel will also be appreciated.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Audrey

Cornell University

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 607/256-4359
102 West Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14853 0

988 Cayuga Heights Road
Ithaca, N.Y.14850

Dr. Anton Lucas
The University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland
New Zealand

July 14, 1980

Dear Anton:

Thank you for your letter of July 1, and I am delighted that, at least tentatively, you are willing to participate in the panel. I have included your name in the proposal I have sent into the AAS, on the assumption that you will eventually be able to find the funds. When I hear from them if the proposal has been accepted, I'll look round here to see if there are any possibilities for some financial help, though at the moment I don't see the possibility of anything more than perhaps a lecture fee. With regard to your other queries, oral presentations will be only about 15 minutes (all the people I invited have agreed to be on the panel, which would mean five oral presentations plus the discussant), but a written paper (~~abou~~ I'm not yet sure regarding length) should go to the discussant by the end of this year and to the AAS Secretariat for duplication and distribution by February 28. I think that if this comes off all right, we should have an audience with a good knowledge of Indonesia, particularly of this period, so national level background will not need to be given.~~xxxwhatxxneeded~~

The AAS stipulates that all panel participants should join the AAS ($25 membership) and register at the conference. I trust this is agreeable with you. In my proposal to the AAS I described the panel as follows:

"The theme of this panel is the local dimension of the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch during the years 1945-1950. Each of the participants has carried out recent research on the history and politics of one particular region of Indonesia. By presenting a view of the Indonesian revolution from the angle of local histories, it is hoped that the panel will provide a new perspective on this period of Indonesian history and possibly provide some insights germane to anti-colonial revolutions in other parts of Southeast Asia...Each panelist will analyze the course of the revolution in one region of Indonesia, its relation to the national leadership, the local perceptions of the national independence struggle, and the major political forces contending there..."

Your paper will clearly not fit exactly to such a format. This is flexible, and I am open to any suggestions from the participants with regard to changes in/form and emphasis.

I'll write again as soon as I hear again from theAAS. Please give our best wishes to the Andayas.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Audrey

Audrey Kahin

The program conmmittee of the AAS expressed some concern at the number of papers to be presented, as the time allotted for the panel is only two and a half hours, and plenty of time needs to be allowed for discussion. May I, therefore, enjoin upon you all that your oral presentations should be limited strictly to 15 minutes, although your written papers may of course be much longer.

May I also remind you that you must join the AAS and register for the annual meeting. I understand that the AAS Secretariat will be sending the necessary forms to you directly.

I will be looking forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

Audrey

Audrey Kahin

Regional Dimension of the Indonesian Revolution

I Background

Very brief encapsulation of character of the society and history of the region; the nature of Dutch colonial rule and the Japanese occupation, and their impact on local society and political balance.

II Leadership during the Revolution

Previous status (social) and position (administrative, trade, participation in nationalist movement, etc.) of local leaders. Extent to which they came to power through local standing and/or national ties, and whether most leaders who headed local Republican government were men who had previously beenappointed to positions of power by either the Dutch or Japanese (or both). What factors (considerations) legitimized exercise of power locally during the revolution? If competition for power between groups and organizations, whether political ideological or religious affiliation, local standing, or ties with national leaders (or some other reason) was responsible for emergence or dominance of a particular group. Carry over of status and position (function) of local leadership during period of revolution into post-revolutionary decade.

III Character and Perceptions of Revolution

Regional perceptions of the meaning and objectives of the revolution (i.e. in terms of social revolution, national and/or ethnic perspectives, religious struggle, anti-imperialism, etc.) Extent to which revolutionary objectives seen as primarily political (displacement of Dutch by Indonesian authority) or socio-economic, i.e. was Revolution regarded simply as struggle against Dutch authority or actual revolution; if latter what kind of revolution? Whether these perceptions changed in response to course of revolution nationally and locally.
How far revolutionary objectives reflected traditional factors, either regional or ethnic, and how far they were perceived in terms of nationalist goals (and symbols) developed over the previous 20-30 years. Potency of Indonesia-wide national objectives and symbols and extent to which they were questioned by groups both within and outside the nationalist camp. Relative strength of competitive objectives and symbols.
Whether there were particular local perceptions as to the effect of international exigencies upon Republican policy (diplomasi or perjuangan); whether outside powers (Britain, U.S. Australia, India, U.S.S.R.) regarded as supportive or opposed to 1) political and 2) socio-economic objectives of the revolution.

I am also asking that each contributor provide a basic chronology (one to two double-space typewritten pages) of the principal events during the Revolution in his/her area. (As editor, I would appreciate it if this could be sent in as soon as possible, at any rate before your main contribution.)

A glossary of terms and acronyms for organizations etc. important in your account should be sent in with your article.

I think each article should have a map. Do you have a good map of your region?